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Abstract

Each year the Department of Defense (DoD) spends billions of dollars on information
technology (IT) outsourcing. However, little formal or academic guidance has appeared that
explains how, why, or even when this occurs. This study presents and evaluates several
determinants that may impact a decision to outsource information technology systems in the
Department of Defense.
It begins with the development of a conceptual model, which was created using semistructured interviews and an extensive literature search. This model was then matured into an
analytic version by using the Delphi method, which is an accepted methodology to use when
insufficient or no applicable data exists, the required data is too expensive to obtain and
analyze, or the problem variables and their interaction are not clearly known.
The results seem to suggest that while some determinants are more important than
others, the decision to outsource IT in the DoD is a multifaceted one. This is consistent with
similar research done in the private sector. The results also seem to suggest that in the area of
IT outsourcing, the DoD seems to be experiencing much the same evolution the private sector
did and that each organization has a slightly different focus and requirement set.

x

AN EVALUATION OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT) OUTSOURCING
DETERMINANTS WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DoD)

I. Introduction
General Information
In the year 2000 total military spending will top approximately $289.8B (in
constant fiscal year 2001 dollars) and total military active duty manning will hover around
1.383M. This is down 40% and 36.2% respectively since 1986 (Budgets, 2000; People,
2000; USAF, 1990). Over the same 14-year period, our society has seen an explosion in
the number, type and capability of telecommunication and information systems. As one of
the most pronounced examples, the Internet has grown from a small research project into
one of the largest revolutions in information sharing and commerce. It is therefore not
surprising that the importance of information and information technology in the military has
also grown. Retired General and former Air Force Chief of Staff, Ronald R. Fogleman has
characterized the increased importance of information as having an "ascending and
transcending influence on military forces" (Fogleman, 1995). As such, he has labeled it the
fifth dimension of warfare, following land, sea, air, and space (Fogleman, 1995). In
addition, Joint Vision 2010, the conceptual template for fixture US warfighting, states "the
emerging importance for information superiority will dramatically impact how well our
Armed Forces can perform it duties in 2010" (CJCS, 1996:8).
However, ensuring information superiority may not simply be a matter of
developing and fielding superior communications and computer equipment. Former

Deputy Secretary of Defense Dr. John Harare states that, "security in the virtual world is as
much a process of management approach and attention as it is of technology" (Harare,
1998). Therefore, it's important that leaders not only concentrate on the technology that
drives these systems, but also on the management that controls them. Of course, this must
all be done in an environment where military outlays and personnel levels continue to
shrink.
One strategy the Department of Defense is currently investigating as a means to
provide the required level of information services to its members while decreasing the
overall cost of information systems is outsourcing.

Definitions
There are numerous perspectives for, and definitions of outsourcing. As an
example, it has been considered using labor market economics (Slaughter, 1996),
management perspectives (Keene, 1998b) resource dependency perspectives (Pfeffer,
1978), and agency theory (Hancox, 1999) just to name a few. This multifaceted nature of
outsourcing has lead to the development of several different and sometimes conflicting
definitions. In fact, a 1991 America survey of chief information officers concluded, "There
is little precision in the term outsourcing." Much of this ambiguity can be attributed to the
constant change in the scope of IT outsourcing. In the early 1960's, organizations would
hire outside firms to simply batch process large amounts of data, or manage small
inexpensive systems. As time progressed, these arrangements grew into the mega-deals,
such as the Kodak/IBM arrangement that have become familiar today (Lacity, 1993).

However, despite the differences and contradictions in the definition, there does
appear to be an agreed upon core in almost everyone's version. This core will be the
working definition used for this research:
"Information technology (IT) outsourcing is the third party provision of IT
products and services" (Hancox, 1999).
A third party can be considered the agent in a principle-agent relationship (Carlton, 2000).
The reference to services includes management and control functions. If these services are
excluded, the relationship tends to be more of a traditional contracting out arrangement
(Keene, 1998b).
Outsourcing and Department of Defense
Almost all firms outsource to some degree. For many years businesses have been
outsourcing their systems development efforts to software houses. (Earl, 1996) Even
military organizations traditionally considered in-house work centers, such as the Air Force
Research Laboratory and other military run research and developmental centers, perform a
certain degree of outsourcing. In today's environment of reduced military personnel and
contractor partnerships, it is difficult to conceive of a situation where a single Department
of Defense (DoD) organization would have a sufficient number of Government personnel
with the correct skill set and experience to design and build the advanced intelligence and
weapon systems required by today's military. At a minimum, the Government would need
to hire civilian experts and consultants when, in the planning stages, their skill set was
incorrectly not thought to be significant.

Due to lower DoD budgets and subsequent manpower drawdowns, the DoD
currently performs even less in-house developmental work than it once did (Brower, 1996).
No longer are external vendors used to simply execute large-scale fabrication efforts
(Bryce, 1996). Rather, they are now being used for research and development as well
transitional management activities. Therefore, any remaining questions regarding whether
outsourcing, or its derivative arrangements, should be used usually revolves around the
operations and maintenance (O&M) services it offers. Consequently, this study will focus
on this area.
Research Questions
This study is an inductive examination of a proposed theory regarding information
technology determinates in the Department of Defense. It will be conducted using the
Delphi Method which is "a method to systematically collect, evaluate, and tabulate
independent opinion without group discussion." (Tersine, 1976:51). The Delphi experts
used to support the study were primarily Chief, or deputy Chief, Information Officers
chosen from Department of Defense or intelligence community agencies. The final output
of this study will be an evaluation of the proposed theory. The research focuses on
outsourcing arrangements that have a direct impact on the entire organization, not just a
specific portion of it. Therefore, only monetarily large outsourcing arrangements will be
considered. Typically these deals run in excess of one million dollars. It should be
emphasized that this research focuses on the determinants that affect a decision to
outsource, not the determinants that affect the amount of outsourcing. A decision to

outsource will precede any decision to determine the level of outsourcing to be used.
Consequently, the primary research question (dependant variable) being addressed is:
1. What determinants affect an outsourcing decision in the Department of
Defense, Air Force or Intelligence Community agencies.
A sub-question is:
la. Whether the proposed determinants have a positive or negative
relationship on the dependant variable.
This study does not focus on any one particular model, but rather considers all preevent IT outsourcing determinants. It draws upon a number of existing theoretical models
from the outsourcing literature that attempt to describe the IT outsourcing decision
process. Presently however, none of these models focus on the DoD. This is a difficult
topic to capture since these issues are "often murky, hidden behind euphemisms, perceived
differently by different stakeholder groups, and generally not easily analyzed" (Hirschheim,
2000:100). However, without this information it is difficult to make any predictions about
the outcome of future outsourcing decisions, except in the most general case of lessons
learned. It is hoped that by providing a comprehensive framework for why these decision
are first made, future decisions can be analyzed using it, which will hopefully lead to a
better forecast of the outcome.
This is similar to the strategy behind any information systems planning (ISP)
process. ISP is "an orderly means of assessing the information needs of an organization
and defining the systems, databases, and technologies that will best satisfy those needs"
(Hoffer, 1999:168).

The first step in ISP is to describe the current situation. If you don't know where
you are it is difficult to get to where you want to be. The crux of this research will be to
develop a theory that explains this for Department of Defense IT outsourcing. The next
ISP step is to describe the target situation, trends and constraints. This will usually lead to
a better understanding of a firm's desired IT outsourcing end-state and therefore, will help
determine what requirements are needed to satisfy using an outsourcing strategy. The last
step is to develop a transition strategy and plan. Once you know where you are and where
you want to go, formulating of a path to get from one to the other should be
straightforward. The transition plan should be a detailed as possible and provide sufficient
guidance to all "levels of management concerning what needs doing, how, when and by
whom in the organization" (Hoffer, 1999: 176). It is hoped that flow-up research in this
area will lead to the development of the last two items.
Potential Benefits
By creating a theory for the IT outsourcing determinants in the military, it is
hoped that a better understanding will be gained of what direction this method of IT
governance should head and how the goals created for it can be attained.
Additionally, the theory could potentially have a more immediate benefit. Since the
final result will essentially be a list of validated determinants, benefits, and risks associated
with IT outsourcing, it could be used to guide future IT outsourcing decision makers.
Also, with slight modifications, it might be able to serve as the basic evaluation criteria for
an IT outsourcing source selection committee.

Thesis Overview
The next chapter will detail the development of a conceptual model. This model
was created from the literature and interviews. Chapter 3 will describe how this research
was conducted and focuses on the Delphi process used to verify the conceptual model.
Chapter 4 will provide the results from the Delphi experiment. Finally, chapter 5 will
provide any insight into why the results showed what they did, list limitations of the
research and provide suggestions on follow-up activities.

II. Literature Review

Types of Outsourcing
As briefly discussed in Chapter 1, outsourcing can be viewed from a variety of
perspectives. From the point of view of labor market economics, outsourcing can be a
firm's response to the costs and disadvantages associated with the traditional permanent
work arrangement that arise from changes in technology and the environment (Slaughter,
1996). Such a response provides flexibility to the firm since they do not have to make a
full and permanent investment to obtain additional personnel to solve what might be a
temporary problem.
According to the General Accounting Office (GAO) outsourcing is:
When a government entity remains fully responsible for the provision
of affected services and maintains control over management
decisions, while another entity operates the functions or performs the
service. This approach includes contracting out, the granting of
franchises to private firms, and the use of volunteers to deliver public
services. (GAO, 1997)
In this definition, the outsourcing customer retains management functions and control
while the provider simply supplements the performance of the firm. However, some argue
that this is not a complete definition. They contend that assets and staff members need to
be transferred from the principal to the agent before outsourcing can occur (Willcocks,
1993). Others are not so radical in their approach, but still propose that outsourcing
includes the partial or full transfer of management to the vendor (Keene, 1998b).
Recently, the terms Smart sourcing, selective sourcing and right sourcing have
been introduced to describe the selective use of outsourcing as opposed to a complete

transfer of the work to a vendor. The optimism attached to this idea is a hope from firms
that outsourcing works best when only selected systems are outsourced (Lacity, 1996).
Still other firms have investigated cooperative outsourcing. In this arrangement the
vendors profits are based on agreed to improvements in the customer's basic corporate
performance, such as earnings, performance against budget, and competitive position
(Scott, 1995).
Additionally, some firms that choose to outsource their IT are now even reinternalizing these services under the heading of imourcing (Meyer, 1994). They feel that
the expected benefits of outsourcing never really materialized and that having more control
over their IT assets is better than having less.
It should also be noted that outsourcing and privatization are usually considered
different arrangements. Typically, privatization is used as a catch-all phrase used to
describe any new use of the private sector such as the divestiture of government facilities
(Tighe, 1997). Therefore, outsourcing can be considered a type of privatization.
Interest in IT Outsourcing
Recently, information technology (IT) outsourcing has been riding a wave of
popularity in the private sector since many companies are now considering IT as a utility or
commodity and therefore able to be performed by any number of firms. (Lacity, 1993).
Consequently, IT outsourcing has became a serious strategic choice for firms (Loh, 1992).
Lower costs and higher performance have become mantras of this movement.
However, firms are learning that IT is different from other business functions
because it permeates an entire organization. It touches nearly every aspect of a business

and therefore cannot be treated as a discrete entity like, security, logistics or advertising.
Therefore, they are discovering that IT outsourcing presents different legal and commercial
issues when compared to more traditional outsourcing arrangements. It's been argued that
the complexity and changing nature of IT, as well as the legal framework governing its uses
typically cause these differences (Antonucci, 1998).
Due to these different qualities, numerous methods have been applied to describe
IT outsourcing. Some research has used popular conceptual models such as principal
agent theory, transaction cost economics, core competencies, agency theory, partnerships
and organizational factors (Brown, 1999; Kim 1998, Hancox, 1999). Some have described
IT outsourcing agreements as being either facilities management, applications management
or managed networks (Rebeiro, 1996). Others have attempted to capture differences in IT
outsourcing by creating categories for each such as network services, service retention,
service transfer, and asset transfer (Takac, 1994).
Difference Between the Private and Public Sector
While many studies exists that examine IT outsourcing in the private sector, almost
none consider its application to the pubic realm, especially the Department of Defense
(McTernan, 1997). However, significant and important differences can potentially exist
between private and public sector firms with regards to IT outsourcing.
Many of these differences might exist due to the presence of inherently
governmental factors that private firms do not need to consider, such as the Information
Technology Management Reform Act (ITRMA) of 1996, statues, federal acquisition
regulations and local requirements and guidelines issued by each agency (Keene, 1998a;
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Keene, 1998b). The Balanced Budget Act and the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) scoring are just a couple of specific factors that do not need to be considered when
making an IT outsourcing decision in the private arena (Keene, 1998a).
Studies in the United Kingdom (UK) have also shown fundamental differences exist
between public and private sector firms with regards to IT outsourcing (Hancox, 1999).
Not surprisingly, some of the largest reported differences are in the political arena. It
needs to be remembered that a public sector organization is not merely a provider of goods
and services, it is also a governmental and political institution constituted by local election
(Hancox, 1999). Also, private sector IT outsourcing decisions are usually based on
profitability and financial effects (Smith, 1998; Loh 1992). However, public sector
organizations sometimes base similar decisions on more personally motivated criteria
(Hancox, 1999). Other differences between public and private sector organizations that
affect IT outsourcing include; stricter procedures, more required coordination, political
difficulties, and policy shifts due to changing administrations (Hancox, 1999).
The type and purpose of IT systems in the government also seems to be inherently
different than those in the private sector. DoD uses of IT are typically very focused, oneof-a-kind applications, such as space exploration, advanced research and development, or
battlefield management. However, private sector firms use IT for broad ranging
applications such as business support or administrative applications (Jones, 1999).
Consequently, it is clear that Government IT outsourcing has the potential to be
inherently different from similar arrangements in the private sector. Therefore, some argue
that a different perspective for IT outsourcing is required for the Government (Keene,
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1998b). Gaining this perspective is even more important when it is realized that
government agencies outsource over twice as many IT services as private firms (Jones,
1999).
Government Interest in IT Outsourcing
Currently, there is concern from Congress that Government Agencies are not
responding to the growth of IT in an appropriate manner. Representative Sanford Bishop
of Georgia has stated in congressional session that, "The telecommunications and
information technology industry appears as a whirlwind with the NSA [National Security
Agency], at the moment, trailing in its wake" (US House, 2000). Comments like this lead
to the creation of Project Groundbreaker, a comprehensive study to outsource almost all of
the NSA's non-core IT activities. While the potential funding associated with this project
is unknown, it has been estimated at over $5B spread over 10 years (Verton, 2000). Given
these figures and the high level attention being paid to IT and IT outsourcing, it is not
surprising that the Department of Defense has increased its interest in outsourcing as a
mode of IT governance.
OMB Circular A-76, Performance of Commercial Activities, directs most all of the
DoD's outsourcing efforts. The motivation behind this process is to emphasize that "in the
process of governing, the Government should not compete with its citizens" (OMB, 1983).
Therefore, the conclusion is made that the Government relies on "commercial sources to
supply products and services the Government needs" (OMB, 1983). The supplement goes
even further to state that an outside source can be selected even it is more expensive, so
long as it provides the best value to the government (OMB, 1996). Armed with these two
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ideas, the DoD can seek outside vendors for its IT systems and work towards not only
reducing costs but increasing value as well.
Proposed IT Outsourcing Theory
When considering IT determinants it is helpful to classify them into categories.
Several frameworks for this purpose have been developed. Some examples of these are
listed in Table 1 below.
Table 1. IT Outsourcing Frameworks
Categories used in model

Model

Business competence
Business governance
IT competence
Cost reduction
Focus on core competence
IS capability
Security and
Environmental
IS improvement
Business impact
Commercial exploitation
Financial
Business
Technical
Political

Loh, 1992

Smith, 1998

Gurbaxani, 1996

Lacity, 1994

Flexibility seems to be an underlying goal for each of these categories. Today's
business environment can change so quickly it is important to weave as much flexibility
into a corporate strategy as possible. Therefore, IT systems must also be able to respond
quickly to changing demands (Antonucci, 1998). Those that outsource hope it will lead to
increased flexibility, yet no single category can exclusively claim this as a goal. For
example, since IT evolves so quickly, by the time a firm purchases hardware and trains its
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staff on how to use it, the technology may be obsolete (Rebeiro, 1996; Slaughter, 1996).
In this case both business and technology categories are impacted. It is also hoped by
some that IT outsourcing can enhance financial flexibility, by providing such services as
guaranteed pricing (Sweeny, 1996). Consequently, it can be seen that flexibility is a goal of
all IT outsourcing determinants.
It has been suggested that because of this flexibility, outsourcing is even more
important in the public sector since such organizations are extremely cautions about
expanding their human resource base due to work rules and implicit employment
guarantees (Slaughter, 1996). Therefore, these firms might use outsourcing to temporarily
hire a contractor for the same task.
Each of the frameworks presented in Table 1 has strengths and weakness to base a
theory of military IT outsourcing determinants on. One notable weakness is the inclusion
of determinants intrinsic to the private sector, such as cash needs and financial leverage
(Loh, 1992). However, that is not to say that fiscal elements should be discounted when
considering military determinants. Cost related factors could quite easily be the largest
determinant for military IT outsourcing. As an example, during the development of the
conceptual model, one interviewee commented that outsourcing provides budget stability
(Barclay, 2000). He explained that in-house re-capitalization expenditures for IT
sometimes make an easy target during budget reductions. However, if such a function
were provided for in a contract, the funding would be more difficult to raid due to
contracting regulations.
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In addition, when compiling a list of IT outsourcing determinants, it is important to
not only consider the benefits associated with the arrangement, but any potential risks as
well. Few decisions will be made without considering the possible repercussions.
Consequently, it is helpful to review any literature that pertains to IT outsourcing risks
when attempting to compile a list of determinants. Some have categorized these risks as
being either political, managerial/technical, legal, organizational, or economic (Keene,
1998b). Others believe the risks can be evaluated using a framework based on business
value and the operational performance of IT (Earl, 1996). Only after considering such
risks, along with any potential gains will a decision on outsourcing be arrived at.
Consequently, each proposed determinant factor listed below has both benefit and risk
determinants associated with it. Each benefit could be considered to have a positive
influence on the research question, while a risk could be considered as having a negative
effect. However, since this these relationships have not been tested, it is difficult to
confirm their existence.
Based on this information, a conceptual model for IT determinants in the military
was developed. As shown in Figure 1, the five categories created for these determinants
are: cost, business, technical, political, security, and environmental. It is theorized that
each of these factors might contribute and impact an outsourcing decision. For the
remainder of the text, the terms IT outsourcing and outsourcing will be used
interchangeably unless specifically differentiated.
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Figure 1. DoD IT Determinants Outsourcing Model
Financial Determinants
Financial determinants are those factors that relate to the fiscal aspects of IT
outsourcing. They directly or indirectly impact overall costs. Some have labeled this
factor the most important advantage provided by outsourcing (Rebeiro, 1996). In the
DoD, these determinants seem to take on special meaning since research has shown that
government agencies focus on them much more than public firms (Jones, 1999). The
proposed cost sub-factors are listed in Figure 2.
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FINANCIAL
Benefits:
- Cost Reductions
- Improved cost controls
- Restructuring IT Budgets
- Protect and stabilize IT Budgets
Risks:
- Increased organizational costs
- Increased coordination costs
- Increased Transactional costs
- Inflated cost savings projections
- Hidden Costs

Decision to
Outsource
Figure 2. Cost Determinants
Benefits: Financial
Cost Reductions. Its been shown that one of the largest motivators behind the use
of IT outsourcing in the government is reduced costs (Jones, 1999).

During this research,

cost reductions were repeatedly labeled the number one reason why outsourcing solutions
should be pursued. In fact, one respondent casually remarked, "is there another reason you
would outsource?" (Folsom, 2000). A government Chief Information Officer (CIO) has
even been quoted that when it comes to outsourcing, "cost is THE driver" (Jones,
1999:29). Cost reduction mechanisms might include economies of scale, tighter control
over fringe benefits, relocation of data centers to lower cost areas, and more focused
expertise in managing IT. (Antonucci, 1998; Smith, 1998)
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Improved cost controls. Typically IT costs are directly related to user demand.
However, most organizations do not have the ability to monitor these demands. Therefore,
many firms simply use general allocation systems to control their IT distributions
(Venkatraman, 1997). Such systems do nothing to encourage users not to request
unnecessary or excessive IT resources. However, in a cost controlled environment, users
would no longer be able to call their favorite analysts to request unneeded changes, but
instead would be required to submit requests through a formal cost control process.
(Lacity, 1994)
Restructuring IT budgets. Sometimes it is desirable to restructure capital budgets
into more flexible operating budgets (Lacity, 1994). This would substitute operations and
maintenance charges for large capital expenditures. As an example, rather than purchasing
large computer systems, time on a vendor's machine could be purchased on an as needed
basis. For the private sector firm this helps generate cash up front, which increases the
participants' cash flow. In public sector firms it might allow different appropriations to be
used for computer operations (Barclay, 2000). This strategy would have an advantage
when operations and maintenance (O&M) funding is easier to obtain than procurement
dollars.
Protect and stabilize IT budgets. As government budgets continue to decline, IT
operations, like all other activities within the government, must remain efficient and
effective. Consequently, IT budgets are routinely inspected for any savings. Additionally,
given the commodity like nature of IT systems, recapitalization budgets for them are
programmed well in advance. These large, static budgets sometimes make an easy target
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during budget reductions exercises. However, if these operations were outsourced, the
funding would be more difficult to raid due in part to contracting regulations (Barclay,
2000). Additionally, long-term contracts improve the financial predictability associated
with these requirements (Martinsons, 1993).
However, this strategy can backfire if the contractor attempts to extort more
funding from the customer at crucial times. This is easier for them if they have become
fully entrenched within a firm (Quinn, 1999).
Risk: Financial
Cost Reduction Risks. While cost savings remain one of the more attractive lures
of outsourcing, some experts remain skeptical about the actual savings it provides. As an
example, some believe that overall costs could actually increase when outsourcing is used
since certain organizational, coordination, or transactional costs usually rise when it is
implemented, especially in public organizations (Hancox, 1999). Others suggest that any
benefits outsourcing actually does provide are slight. They explain that vendor discounts
achieved from economies of scale can sometimes be negligible (Martinsons, 1993). They
further argue that changes in software licensing agreements have greatly reduced a vendors
advantage in this area (Lacity, 1993). Also, since costs are difficult to estimate, inaccurate
cost saving projections may be made (Quinn, 1999). Even when IT costs can be estimated,
vendors will sometimes charge for services that a customer might easily assume are
covered in the contract such as supplies, office space or documentation. The vendor might
also try to hide the true costs of a contract by providing a financial package whose net
present value is extremely attractive. This may take the form of delayed payments or credit
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for a customer's hardware (Lacity, 1993). Some argue that such hidden costs are the
biggest problem associated with IT outsourcing (Willcocks, 1994). It has been proposed
that to truly determine whether outsourcing will produce cost savings, senior managers
must know all the current costs of their information management activities (Martinsons,
1993).
In addition, vendors typically cut service to lower costs (Hirschheim, 2000). It has
been shown that if internal IT departments are allowed to decreases service by comparable
amounts they could also attain similar cost savings. While such actions might appease
senior management, users typically become upset when there IT service levels decrease
(Lacity, 1993).
Business Determinants
Business determinants focus on elements of organizational efficiency and
effectiveness. It's been proposed that when these factors are in balance, IT can be fully
exploited (DiRomualdo, 1998). As seen in Figure 3, benefits associated with these factors
include focus on core competency, influence of government regulations, and facilitating
reorganizations. Risks include the inability to write an adequate service level agreement,
inability to manage a contract, inability to folly leverage IT and loss of control.
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BUSINESS
Benefits:
- Focus on Core Competency
- Influence of government regulations
- Facilitating reorganizations
Risks:
- Inability to write an adequate SLA
- Inability to manage a contract
- Inability to fully leverage IT
- Loss of control

Decision to
Outsource
Figure 3. Business Determinants
Benefits: Business
Focus on core competency. During the 1990's several large corporations
abandoned their strategy of diversification for a more focused approach. Originally,
diversification was used to mediate risks but now some executives believe that a strategic
focus is a more important competitive advantage (Lacity, 1994). By concentrating on
core competencies it is thought that a company can focus more of its power than anyone
else on the few capabilities that customers genuinely care about (Quinn, 1999). Therefore,
core competencies are those things a company does better than any other. They can be
both skills and systems that are considered to operate at best in world levels and "though
which a company creates uniquely high value for customers" (Quinn, 1999: 12). As an
example, both Sears and General Electric have recently divested themselves of many
ancillary business units to focus on their core activities (Rumsfled, 1995; Torode, 1997).
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Public companies have adopted this idea so strongly; some have listed it as the primary
reason to outsource (Jones, 1999).
This refocusing has several effects including simplifying the management agenda,
flattening organizations, leveraging innovation, increased employee motivation and
cohesion, and freeing up resources in the form of funding and personnel to apply to more
strategic activities (Lacity, 1995; Martinsons, 1993; Quinn, 1999; Smith, 1998). Other
benefits in this area include increased hardware utilization, improved manufacturing yield
and productivity improvements (Savage, 1998).
However, some suggest that the selection of IT as simply core or non-core is too
rudimentary. They would argue that the subject needs to be decomposed even further.
Consequently, frameworks have now been created that compare the contribution of an IT
activity to business operations against the contribution of an IT activity to business
positioning (Lacity, 1996). However, for the purposes of this research, that distinction will
not be considered. Only the simple existence of the core competency variable will be
examined.
Government regulatioas and guidelines. Several recent Congressional actions such
as the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 and the Paperwork Reduction
Act of 1995 require government to work more efficiently. With the enactment of the
Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996, IT is looked at as an enabler to
make this happen. However, IT itself is under the same scrutiny to maintain efficiency.
Outsourcing can potentially be used as a method to demonstrate an agencies desire to
maintain this efficiency. In addition, some government regulations mandate the use of
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outsourcing in certain situations. Therefore, IT managers might be required to outsource
regardless of other factors.
Facilitating reorganizations. Modifications to organizational structures are made
for a variety of reasons. Changes in mission, tasks, reporting relationships, and
coordination mechanisms are just a few (Griffen, 2000). Companies can use outsourcing
as a change agent when they want to dramatically alter their overall structure (Scott,
1995).
After reorganizations occurs, IT managers can then use it to absorb and unite
dissimilar systems into their firms existing IT architecture. In the private sector such
actions must not only occur when a reorganizations occurs, but also after a merger or
acquisition. Therefore, outsourcing can be viewed as a means to solve technical
incompatibilities, absorb excess IT assets and absorb unnecessary IT employees generated
by a merger (Lacity, 1994).
Risks: Business
Tnahilitv to write an adequate servil level agreement. A firms' ability to establish a
solid service level agreement (SLA) might also effect its decision to outsource (Lacity,
1995). SLA's provide a full and detailed description of the services, an agreed standard of
service, a service level appraisal procedure and an audit provision for a contract (Rebeiro,
1996). Some feel that this is such an important document it is the only instrument that can
ensure expectations will be realized after an outsourcing decision has been made (Klochko,
1994). However, it is sometimes very difficult to precisely specify what is desired (Quinn,
1999). To develop a good SLA, a firm must first understand what services are needed and
then translate those needs into specific contract deliverables. Both of these actions present
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several problems. First, in order to understand what services a firm needs it must first
understand its own processes. Only after these processes are folly understood can the
firms' information requirements be established. Gaining this understanding can be a very
difficult task (Hoffer, 1999). Second, once these requirements are established they must be
properly transformed into binding contractual deliverables. During this transformation,
attention to detail becomes critical. Recent studies have shown that even the approach and
strategy used for IT outsourcing can affect the business value (Richmond, 1993). In fact,
"the price the user pays for the system depends on the form of the contract and the degree
of competition among the vendors, with lower prices associated with more competition"
(Richmond, 1993: 71). The contract needs to be structured so that it can change based on
what is, or is not, known about the "business, the course of technology, and the capabilities
of outside providers and the company's own IT department" (Lacity, 1995: 89).
However, the problems associated with this process should lessen as the DoD
moves from statements of work (SOW) to performance work statements (PWS), which is
the heart of the A-76 process (Paddock, 1987). Whereas a SOW might list detailed
procedures and specifications associated with completing a job, a PWS only provides the
general requirement and lets the vendor decide how to perform the task (Harney, 1998).
This is a more dynamic vehicle since it allows the vendor to use discretion when allocating
their resources and deciding how to best provide the services required (Paddock, 1987).
Oftentimes the requested services are abstractions, such as pilot training, as opposed to
flight simulators, as would be the case in a statement of work contract.
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Further flexibility can be gained by agreeing to short-term contracts and including
clauses that mandate periodic reviews. However, these items do not come cheap. In
reality, they are usually accompanied by cost premiums. Additionally, any variations from
the original requirements must always be funded. Therefore, some believe that even if the
requirements could be accurately captured and communicated to the vendor, any savings
would be negligible after they were calculated (Earl, 1996)
Inability to manage a contract. Along with the dangers associated with developing
an outsourcing contract, there are several risks associated with a firm attempting to control
it. Typically, members of the internal IT staff are tasked to perform this function.
However, many times these individuals have not been properly trained for these duties
(Lacity, 1995). They may be excellent programmers or computer maintainers, but not have
the necessary skills to oversee and monitor contractual arrangements. This change can be a
traumatic experience for senior IT managers who have to modify their roles from handling
personnel issues to managing contract negotiations and administrative functions. As Earl
asks, "if the IT activity has been badly managed in the first place, will the IT managers be
any better at managing an external provider?" (Earl, 1996: 27). Some feel that it is
important to consider a firms ability to perform these functions before an outsourcing
decision is made (Lacity, 1995).
Inability to fullv leverage IT. In the past IT was simply viewed as an overhead
burden that needed to be funded. It was considered part of a firm's infrastructure, able to
only support other more value added functions and roles. It was not considered an integral
part of a firm since it did not create profit. Since IT was only viewed as serving non-core
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functions, it was subject to outsourcing (Quinn, 1999). However, organizations are now
starting to view IT as an investment and even profit center. They no longer consider it as
they do office supplies, but rather are starting to understand that IT can maximize business
opportunities and even generate revenue (Venkatraman, 1997).
Many times, a firm's ability to get IT to perform as a profit center is based on its
experience with it (Hammer, 1994). A firm must work closely with the technology to truly
understand it. In support of this, Hammer and Champy believe that firms need to start
thinking about IT inductively rather than deductively (Hammer, 1994). Only after
considering what IT can do for a business rather than how IT can solve a specific problem,
can the true potential of it be realized.
However, if a firm outsources its IT, there is less potential that it will be able to
realize and understand its true power. Many times marketable IT systems were discovered
only after employees recognized that systems originally intended for internal use had
potential in the marketplace. It is possible that this important organizational learning
phenomenon will be lost if IT is outsourced (Earl, 1996)
Toss of control. Perhaps the greatest disadvantage to an outsourcing company is
the loss of direct control over the business areas outsourced (Rebeiro, 1996). One reason
why this may be such a risk are all the potential ways control can be lost. For example, if it
is difficult for customers to relate IT requirements to the vendor, the vendor may simply
provide the services they deem appropriate which may not necessarily be what the
customer wants. Therefore, the customer can lose control of the services provided.
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In addition, when services are outsourced, there is typically no longer a need for as
many internal IT specialists. However, if these people leave a company they take their
skills with them. When this occurs the firm can lose control over their own destiny by
becoming overly dependent on the contractor. This can fuel a further loss of control over
the timing and quality of outputs (Quinn, 1999). This can become important in the military
when battlefield commanders halfway around the world need stateside support, but are
refused because a contract does not allow for it. As some have recognized, IT outsourcing
is nearly an irrevocable act. Once it is performed it is nearly impossible to repeal.
(Martinsons, 1993; NSA, 1999a).
Technical Determinants
As the technology that drives modern information systems continues to evolve at
breakneck speeds, a firm's ability to keep up becomes even more difficult. Companies
want to ensure that the hardware and software resources driving their IT systems are as
productive as possible (DiRomualdo, 1998). Consequently, organizations will sometimes
consider outsourcing as a way to stay current and maintain a technical edge over their
competition. As can be seen in Figure 4, improving technical services, access to technical
talent and technologies are all outsourcing benefits that organizations hope will help them
maintain their edge. To some in government, these determinants have been considered the
second most important set of factors after reducing costs (Jones, 1999).
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Decision to
Outsource
TECHNICAL
Benefits:
- Improving Technical Services
- Access to Technical Talent
- Access to New Technologies
Risks:
- Problems accessing new talent
- Problems with new technologies
-Inadequate back-up capability
- Excess integration problems

Figure 4. Technical Determinants
Benefits: Technical
Improving technical services. Many times a company will turn to outsourcing when
they are dissatisfied with their own IT departments. Systems delivered late and over
budget as well as delays responding to user requests are some of the problems that cause
this attitude (Lacity, 1994).
Access to technical talent. As technology continues to become more complex and
specialized, it is difficult to find experts that understand how to manage it. Further, even if
a company does succeed in luring these individuals, many are finding it difficult to retain
them. (Lacity, 1994). Some consider a firm's ability to locate and acquire these individuals
crucial to their success (Slaughter, 1996).
By acquiring new talent via outsourcing a firm will not only infuse its current staff
with new thoughts, ideas and experiences, but also gain the freedom to reassign their
current internal staff members to higher priority activities such as the development of more
strategic-level systems that can deliver a competitive advantage. Many times this personnel
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redistribution can increase productivity and create a stronger foundation for future business
success (Martinsons, 1993). This advantage can be considerable in the military since it
costs more to develop an internal, skilled IT worker than it does in the private sector due
to the additional military training a member must undergo. Consequently, it is especially
important to assign these individuals to the systems and programs were the return on
investment is the highest possible.
Access to new technologies. Many times outsourcing is seen as a tool that can
provide a firm with emerging technology by giving them access to a vendors large research
and development efforts. They feel that the vendors can help them leapfrog or catch up to
the competition (Martinsons, 1993). Hardware and software systems today need to be
constantly updated or replaced. It is growing increasingly difficult to stay current given the
rate of change (Antonucci, 1998).
Risks: Technical
Potential problems with obtaining new technical talent.

As one might expect,

there are some who believe that the expectation outsourcing will provide new talent to an
organization is overstated. They point out that as organizations move towards
outsourcing, employees start fearing they will lose their jobs. To appease this fear agencies
start considering different vertical restraints in the principle-agent relationship, such as softsourcing. Soft-sourcing is when a customers employees are given preferential treatment
when applying for their job after it has been outsourced (NSA, 1999b). In fact, this
provision can even be included as a clause to an A-76 study or an outsourcing contract.
While such a clause might help minimize any personal impact caused by outsourcing, it can
counteract the desired effect of introducing new technical talent into the organization.
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Additionally, any above average talent hired by a vendor many times will not even be
assigned to their original jobs. Instead, the vendor will use them to win new contracts and
accounts (Lacity, 1994).
Also, many new companies that compete for IT contracts do not have a large pool
of talent. What qualified employees they might have only posses a small amount of
experience solving the specific type of problems their previous customers had. Also, how
can a customer be certain that a vendor will continue to update and keep their staff
current? Many times, outsourcing firms will win a contract to manage a new technology
but eventually even this technology will become obsolete. Customers continually want the
latest technology to increase productivity, however, if the vendor does not upgrade their
staff, it will be difficult for them to respond (Earl, 1996).
Potential problems with accessing new technologies. As systems become more
advanced, they also become more complex and interdependent. This makes it increasing
difficult to isolate problems when they arise. It is sometimes difficult to determine if a
problem is caused by a terminal, network, application, or communication system If
outsourcing is used, vendor and customer interfaces only serve to complicate this problem
(Earl, 1996).
Also, some argue that the newer a technology is, the less it should be outsourced.
They believe a firm will face additional risk when they outsource immature technologies
because it is more difficult to adequately capture contract requirements due to a lack of
understanding surrounding it (Lacity, 1996). These individuals would therefore argue that
mature technologies are easier to outsource since the firm has usually overcome the initial
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learning curve and reached a point were it now understands the technology and is able to
adequately define requirements.
Inadequate recovery and back-up capability. Several computer dependent
organizations have gone into liquidation following system disasters (Fink, 1994).
Consequently, it is important that organizations ensure they are protected from such blows
or can recover from them should they occur. If a firm's management does not feel that a
vendor could adequately guarantee the protection of its information, it might be less likely
to outsource.
Excess integration and interoperability problems. When considering whether to
outsource IT, integration issues can also become a major concern (Lacity, 1996). When
the required amount of integration between an outsourced activity and other business
processes or technical systems is high, the risks associated with outsourcing increase. If
two different contractors control separate but interrelated activities, finger pointing can
arise between them when the entire system is not working correctly. This leaves the
organization caught in the middle with little information as to where the real problem lies.
Some suggest that this problem is even more of an issue in the government due to
its passion with interoperability. Some federal CIO's have even "acknowledged that their
number one priority is interoperability among the division in the enterprise" (Jones, 1999).

Political Determinants
As one might expect the political aspects of outsourcing might be most powerful
within a public sector firm The political dimension involves "the behavior of the various
parties involved in the decision-making process and how they shape senior management's
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perception about IT and its value" (Lacity, 1994). For the purposes of this research these
determinants focus on the satisfaction of personal needs. As seen in Figure 5, there are
several potential political determinants including: proving efficiency, justifying new
resources, exposing exaggerated claims, eliminating a troublesome function, breaking the
so-called glass ceiling and lack of trust.

Decision to
Outsource
A

POLITICAL
Benefits:
- Proving efficiency.
- Justifying New Resources
- Exposing Exaggerated Claims
- Eliminating a troublesome function
- Breaking the so-called glass ceiling
Risks:
-Lack of Trust

Figure 5. Political Determinants
Benefits: Political
Proving efficiency. Many times organizations will account for IT expenditures
simply as an overhead expense and evaluate them based on cost efficiency. When this is
done however, it is difficult to develop any concrete measures of efficiency. Therefore,
some IT managers will support obtaining outsourcing proposals in the hopes that it will
prove the efficiency of the internal IT departments and justify its continued existence. It
has been shown that after an outsourcing evaluation was conducted IT managers have
successful convinced senior managers and users that their internal IT departments could
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perform the same services an outside vendor could perform for the same amount or less
(Hirschheim, 2000).
A potential drawback to this strategy is the chance senior managers might view the
results with skepticism. This could occur if they believe that IT managers biased the results
by selectively picking only their most efficient and best managed projects for the
outsourcing evaluation. If they did not include an accurate representation of their IT
department in the request for proposal, the results would not be a true reflection of the
costs associated with an outsourcing solution.
■Tustifving new resources. Since IT is many times looked upon only as a cost
center, senior managers will proceed warily when asked to dedicate additional resources to
it (Venkatraman, 1997). Therefore, IT managers believe that if they can show outsourcing
is not a more cost effective and efficient method to obtain new services, senior leaders will
be more inclined to authorize additional funding for internal projects. (Lacity, 1994)
However, this request may also be considered biased if senior management does
not view the justifications as credible. Some believe that the best way to handle a
credibility issue within an IT department is to involve senior management, and outside
independent experts, in the outsourcing evaluation. (Lacity, 1994)
Exposing exaggerated claims. With the explosion in IT outsourcing, many senior
managers are anxious to ensure that their firms are taking full advantage of this new
method of IT governance (Loh, 1992a). However, IT managers sometimes fear this zeal
will seduce their leaders into an outsourcing relationship prematurely. Consequently, some
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IT mangers will commission outsourcing evaluations to expose any exaggerated claims an
outside firm has made (Lacity, 1994).
However, if senior management does not feel the IT department is capable of
making an unbiased, rational outsourcing decision, they may commission their own
outsourcing evaluation without the involvement of the IT department. Therefore, if senior
managers believe that IT managers are stalling on an outsourcing decision by constantly
researching the problem, they may move ahead with the decision independent of the IT
group. (Lacity, 1994)
Eliminating a troublesome function. Due to the seemingly constant stream of
available upgrades for information systems, its growing increasingly difficult for a firm's IT
and senior mangers to understand how newer systems can be leveraged to make the
organization run more efficiently. In addition, IT mangers and staff members usually
receive few praises but much abuse. When the systems are working correctly few people
even notice the actions of these individuals. However, when something goes wrong,
everyone immediately starts to curse and disparage them. This has caused several
individuals to re-evaluate whether the constant flow of problems associated with the work
is truly worth any compensation (Lacity, 1994).
Breaking the so-called glass ceiling. Many IT directors see themselves as not being
fully appreciated and valued by senior management. Few IT managers break into the upper
echelons of management within a firm (Lacity, 1994). Therefore, they might turn to
outsourcing as a way to appear more corporate and creditable in the hopes of enhancing
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their own career. Research has shown that several IT managers have initiated outsourcing
evaluations to help alleviate any misconceptions that they are myopic (Lacity, 1994).
Risks: Political
Lack of trust between government and contractors. It is important that in any
contracting action, trust exists between the principal and agent. Trust can be defined as "a
confidence that the behavior of another will conform to one's expectations and in the
goodwill of another" (Hart, 1997:24). When IT work is performed in-house the
participants typically know one another and therefore have a certain degree of trust in each
other (Sabherwal, 1999). In this situation, unexpected problems associated with the work
are easier to deal with. However, due to project center elements, structural mechanisms
and unique reporting arrangements, trust is sometimes more difficult to obtain in IT
outsourcing arrangements. Trust stems from a psychological contract between the
principal and agent. This contract consists of unwritten expectations held by both parties
regarding each other's prerogatives and obligations. When trust is present a "virtuous
cycle" (Sabherwal, 1999: 83) is present between the psychological contract, the written
contract and performance. This leads to a high quality product in a timely manner. If trust
is not present a 'Vicious cycle" (Sabherwal, 1999: 83) can exist between the same three
elements and lead to a poor quality product and multiple delays.
Security Determinants
Security is a factor that some might think could be placed in the business, technical,
or even political category. However, due to several unique features associated with the
subject, it was thought that making it a separate category was warranted. Additionally,
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security, and security implications, were a common theme and source of uncertainty for
individuals interviewed during the development of the conceptual model.
Security issues are common to all IT contracts; however, in outsourcing
agreements they hold special meaning. (Rebeiro, 1996). As an example, some have
proposed that the security framework used when IT work is outsourced is different than if
the work is kept in-house. The key reasons given for this are a shift in emphasis from
physical protection to recovery, changes in the roles of application controls, and the need
to place a greater reliance on general controls (Fink, 1994). Also, others feel that a
different organizational security structure is needed when IT work is outsourced
(Sherwood, 1997). It is important that both the customer and vendor create appropriate
jobs to deal with potential security issues. It is equally important to formalize
communication channels between the parties. Communication is repeatedly listed as the
principal factor necessary to create and maintain a healthy security IT outsourcing
relationship (Caldwell, 1997; Sherwood, 1997; Ryan, 1999).
Another feature unique to the security of DoD systems is the critical nature and
special importance of the national security data contained in them. Little doubt exists that
the DoD has special security requirements. These requirements are to maintain national
security and ensure mission accomplishment (DoAF, 1996; DoD, 1996). Consequently,
any information contained in a classified IT system must be controlled as stringently as if it
were in hardcopy form. In fact, more precautions must sometimes be taken when dealing
with classified IT systems due to the inherent vulnerabilities of a computer system that do
not exist for hardcopy documents such as emanations and mass storage capability
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(Denning, 1999). Therefore, it is no surprise that government agencies invest more in
security than public firms (Jones, 1999).
However, several commercial industries such as banking, telecommunications, and
online commerce also have very high security requirements. It then becomes important to
determine how additionally significant security is to DoD outsourcing decisions? As has
been asked before, "is the need for enhanced security for military operations a factor to
maintain a blue suit or in-house IT capability and are military security requirements greater
than those in the commercial sector?" (McTernan, 1997).
Due to the nature of security, it is something that can only be diminished or lost.
The greatest amount is achieved when only one person knows the information and does not
tell anyone else. In fact, in this situation, very little if any security is required. However, as
the number of people with access to the information grows, so does the need for security.
As the amount of required security increases, primary work process tend to slow (Gips,
2000). Security checks, special procedures, and locked rooms all impede work
requirements. Additionally, when extra processes are added to any situation, the chances
of something going wrong increase. In the military, when something goes wrong with
security, the work is usually halted. Consequently, it is difficult to conceive of a situation
where security is a benefit; it will almost always be a risk.
As can be seen in Figure 6, the three proposed security risks are, controlling access
to the information, overall vendor security procedures, and release of competitive
advantage.
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Figure 6. Security Determinants
Risks: Security
Controlling ar^ss to the information. One type of security risk concerns a
vendor's employees and the access they have to information. Typically, computer
programmers and maintenance personnel from an outsourcing firm require detailed
knowledge of a customers IT infrastructure to do their job. However, by granting this
level of access, a fair amount of network control is being given to them (Talley, 1998).
Even when something as innocuous as secretarial and administrative functions are
outsourced, the data housed in a customers system are put at risk. This risk is even more
pronounced when external security specialists are used to inspect and audit a customers
system.
Given the rate of change in IT along with the size and complexity of many
corporate systems, its difficult for internal computer security personnel to ensure that every
network is secure. Consequently, many large companies are turning to external security
personnel to diagnose and test their systems (Caton, 1999; Talley, 1998). Yet these
consultants typically need full and complete access to an organizations system when
conducting an audit. This helps ensure that the results are as comprehensive as possible.
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However, since an external firm will be analyzing the vulnerabilities of a customers
network, they could potentially use that information against them. If the DoD were the
customer, it would be very easy for the consultant to sell any information it collected to a
potential adversary (Martinsons, 1993; Quinn, 1999). Additionally, since background
checks in the private sector are sometimes not as thorough as they could be, foreign agents
might be able to infiltrate a critical DoD IT system simply by posing as an employee of the
consulting firm.
Another issue relating to network access revolves around double sourcing. This is
the practice of a prime contractor using subcontractors to fulfill customer requirements
(Caldwell, 1997). Some experts believe that an average of 36% of all work performed on
IT contracts is done using double sourcing (Caldwell, 1997). However, since most
subcontractors are typically not as large as prime contractors, it is harder for them to
perform in depth background checks on each employee. Consequently, someone who
might not pass the original customers security check could still end up working on their IT
systems without them ever knowing. One potential solution to this problem is to provide
the prime contractor with a list of pre-approved vendors. In the DoD, this practice is
known as using directed subcontractors. By using directed subcontractors, the DoD might
decrease its exposure to any potential security problems caused by an unfamiliar firm. The
problem with this arrangement is that the DoD assumes most risks associated with that
subcontractor. Therefore, if the subcontractor defaults for any reason, the Government
does not have recourse back to the prime contractor. Consequently, any cost or schedule
impacts caused by such problems would be the sole burden of the DoD.
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Overall vendor security procedures. Another risk is a potentially weak vendor
security plan. How vendors handle customer data on their own systems, correspond with
each other via e-mail, and simply dispose of a customers information after it is no longer
needed, are questions that might need to be considered by a firm before it decides to
contract with a vendor (Ryan, 1999). In addition, vendors typically supply services to
several companies including competitors and adversaries. Given the critical nature of the
national security information contained in DoD IT systems, the benefits of outsourcing may
not outweigh the risks.
Release of competitive advantage. In today's military, technology plays a key role.
Our forces can dominate the battlespace because of their access to the latest technology
and equipment. However, this advantage assumes our systems are more advanced than the
enemy's. To ensure the United States preserves this advantage, the DoD funds research
and development projects so that its fixture systems will always be more current and
capable than those of its adversaries. Currently, the military is not only using IT to
transmit information, but also to deny, disrupt, disable or even destroy an enemy's
infrastructure (CJCS, 1996). In a similar manner, corporations are starting to understand
the benefit of using IT systems to gain competitive advantages. No longer are they viewed
as cost centers. Today, IT is being looked at as a profit maker (Venkatraman, 1997).
However, in both of these situations, if outsourcing were used, there is the potential
that the technical data associated with these systems could become compromised. If this
occurred, an adversary might be able to determine how to defeat such a system, or build a
similar system This would negate any advantage (Martinsons, 1993). The potential
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information released in this determinant differs from the information that might be
compromised in the controlling access to the information determinant since that factor
considers only the information contained in the system, whereas this determinant focuses
on the release of system design information. Typically, even security specialists will not
have access to this type of information, only designers or specialized maintenance
personnel.
Environmental Determinants
Like security, environmental factors could be considered part of another categories.
However, none of the previously mentioned factors captures the multifaceted nature of
environmental determinants. As an example, diffusion theory has been advanced as a
mechanism for the increased use of IT outsourcing. This theory has business aspects
attached to it such as maintaining efficiency and effectiveness as well as political overtones
such as making a business choice based on the behavior of others.
Since there is a reduced emphasis placed on producing a profit within a public
sector organization (Hancox, 1999) many of the reasons why private sector firms
outsource IT are ininirnized (Smith, 1999; Loh, 1992a). Therefore, given the political
nature of public sector firms, environmental factors may be even more important than in
the private sector. As seen in Figure 7, examples include length of service, imitative
behavior among firms, and internal resistance.
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ENVIRONMENT
Benefits:
-Length of service
- Changes in amount of outsourcing
Risks:
- Internal resistance

Decision to
Outsource
Figure 7. Environment Determinants
Benefits: Enviornmental
T .enpth of service remaining for outsource decision makers. Using agency theory
it's been shown that the amount of time IT executives feel they will be in a particular
position or role can potentially effect the outcome of an outsourcing decision (Loh, 1993).
The time horizon is "a crucial dimension affecting managerial decision making with respect
to IT projects" (Loh, 1993:223).
Therefore, the amount of outsourcing in DoD organizations might be dependent on
the fact that Military members fill a particular position only temporarily. As programs
continue to grow in complexity, scope, and time required for completion, it is inevitable
that individuals associated with such programs begin to realize that their position will have
a successor. This might help an incumbent feel less responsible for their actions and any
potential derogatory outcomes. It is therefore conceivable that if they feel they will be
changing jobs in the near future, they will be more likely to outsource. On the other hand,
it is equally possible that the longer they know they will be in a position the more likely
they will outsource. This could be due in part to their desire to rid themselves of what they
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might consider the small repetitive problems IT operations present and focus their effort on
more strategic related issues.
Changes in the amount of TT outsourcing within the DoD. In 1989 Kodak
outsourced most of its IT infrastructure requirements to IBM. When this occurred, some
felt a great deal of interest was generated in the business community regarding the potential
competitive advantage that such a move would create (Loh, 1992b).
This advantage stems from the fact that IT outsourcing can be considered a
fundamental shift in the business strategy (Henderson, 1992). Specifically it represents a
significant shift in the IT strategy and mode of governance. IT governance includes the
choices of structural mechanism (e.g., joint ventures long-term contracts, equity
partnerships, joint R&D) a firm makes to obtain the required IT capabilities, involving
issues such as the deployment of proprietary versus common networks as well as strategic
choices pertaining to development of partnerships to exploit IT capabilities and services.
In addition, it radically changes the internal processes and routines of the user organization.
As such it can be considered as an administrative innovation. Once a firm adopts an
innovation, it is diffused or communicated through certain channels over time among the
members of the firms social system.
Studies have shown that when Kodak, a respected firm within a social system,
outsourced its IT systems, other firms in the system followed (Loh, 1992b). This has been
labeled the "Kodak effect." This might explain why some firms continue to outsource even
after they have been warned against it. Evidence supports that this diffusion of innovation
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among government agencies might be one of the strongest determinants behind IT
outsourcing (Kim, 1998).
However, others feel that the evidence does not support the "Kodak effect" (Hu,
1997). They feel the parameters used to prove the existence of the effect where not
properly estimated or implemented. However, like the original study, they also claim that
the diffusion of IT outsourcing is not a random process. Yet, they feel a mixed influence
model rather than the internal-influence model used in the first study best describes the
process.
Risks: Environmental
Internal resistance. Concern over displaced IT staff members can effect a firms
decision to outsource its IT (Lacity, 1995). Many times a backlash of fear among IT staff
members is generated when outsourcing is considered (Quinn, 1999). When IT employees
hear their jobs are in jeopardy of being outsourced they may feel demoralized and decide to
leave a company (Antonucci, 1998). Even if they stay and are not laid-off, they may feel
that outsourcing has decreased the visibility of their jobs and decide to quit (Martinsons,
1993). It could be very important for a firm to consider these thoughts before they
outsource. Such a decision may cause serious, unwanted repercussions.
This conceptual model represents an attempt to capture all the reasons why a DoD
or IC agency might outsource their IT. It was developed using interviews and an extensive
literature search. The next chapter will focus on the process that was used to validate it
and convert it into more of an analytic form.
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III. Methodology
Introduction
As shown, there are a number of potential determinants for IT outsourcing in the
DoD, which help form a conceptual model. The goal in this stage of the research was to
inductively determine, using quantitative measures, the validity of this conceptual model
by attempting to form a consensus among experts in several Government agencies
regarding the validity of the determinates in each factor. The result was an analytic model
that can be analyzed used in further research.
Development of the Conceptual Model
Development of the conceptual model began by interviewing several individuals
working in IT outsourcing within the DoD. These interviews lead to a number of possible
determinants, which were then used to initially guide a literature search. This search was
then expanded to include as many aspects of IT outsourcing as possible in the hopes of
providing additional insight into what IT outsourcing determinants are present in the DoD.
Since most of the literature pertained to private sector firms, it was obvious that some
determinants, such as debt and equity financing (Loh, 1992a), had no place in an
outsourcing theory centered on public organizations. Therefore, such determinants were
ultimately dropped from further consideration.
While most of the literature used to develop the conceptual model was based on
validated findings, some was notional information based on the experiences of different
authors. Consequently, the final conceptual model could be considered as a combination
of expert and academic opinion along with grounded theories. Since anecdotal evidence
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comprised part of the theory, the entire model needed to be validated. Once this was
completed it could be considered to be in analytic form.

The Delphi Technique
The Delphi technique was chosen to validate the conceptual model since it is well
suited to developing a consensus of expert opinion. The basic premise behind this method
is that two (or many) minds are better than one. It was originally developed by the RAND
Corporation in the 1960's to help decision makers formulate broad or long-range policy.
It is a formalized process to determine the best answer or solution to a problem whenever
insufficient or no applicable data exists, the required data is too expensive to obtain and
analyze, or the problem variables and their interaction are not clearly known.
Consequently, it is intended to work in the regime of opinion between mere speculation
and knowledge. It should be noted that while the traditional purpose of the Delphi
method is to make predictions about the future, this study uses it to define critical issues in
information technology. However, its use for this purpose is well supported (Dickson,
1984;Brancheau, 1987;Niederman, 1991;Brancheau, 1996; Westbrook, 1997).
Basically, the Delphi approach "solicits input from a panel of experts who
contribute individually" (Griffin, 1999:280). It is based on an iterative set of
questionnaires that attempt to capture the thoughts and feelings of a group on a particular
subject. At the end of each round, input obtained from the experts is averaged and the
results broadcast back to the group. The same questions are then asked again, the results
analyzed, and the conclusions modified. This cycle of questions, feedback, questions
continue until the prediction stabilizes. The final conclusion is considered to be the
decision of the experts. (Clayton, 1997)
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The Delphi method can be considered a complement to the panel approach.
However, unlike the panel, it provides more information regarding "uncertainties or
disagreements about the subject and quantitatively evaluates the degree of uncertainty
which exists within a large group of experts." (Goldstein, 1971:225).

Advantages of Delphi
Anonymity and controlledfeedback.
A notable characteristic of the Delphi method is that it masks the identities of the
participants, which helps lower the amount of group discussion (Tersine, 1976). This is
desirable since it has been shown that such discussion tends to produce less reliable results
than when contact between participants is controlled (Dalkey, 1969).
Less Confrontational
Since the identities of the participants are not revealed, the input provided by a
specific group member is not directly linked to them. All feedback given is an aggregate
of member responses. This allows other group members to respond to comments without
regard to their personal feelings about the originator. In addition, since interaction is
anonymous, members can feel free to change their minds without feeling self-conscious.
Therefore, many of the usual problems associated with group dynamics are eliminated
(Martino, 1978). These benefits are similar to those offered by computerized group
support systems (Laudon, 1999)
Fewer constraints.
Many times, due to funding or scheduling constraints, the members of a group
cannot meet. The Delphi technique allows individuals to interact with each other who
cannot be brought together for a face-to-face discussion (Linstone, 1978).
Statistical Response.
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It allows a qualitative measurement to be made of an inherently qualitative
response. The Delphi attempts to measure the opinions of others by attaching a numerical
result to the response. These numbers help guide the study and show when consensus has
been reached (Martino, 1978).
Multiple Uses.
The Delphi method is well suited for multiple applications. It has been used in
both the commercial and public sector for numerous reasons including, "exposing
priorities of personal values and social goals, explaining the pros and cons associated with
potential policy options, evaluating budget allocation, examining the significance of
historical events, and distinguishing or clarifying perceived and real human motivations"
(Linstone, 1978).
Weaknesses of Delphi
Selection of experts.
Each member selected to participate in the Delphi must be qualified and motivated.
It is critical to the process that the responses generated come from knowledgeable
individuals. These individuals must also be committed to the study until the end. Due to
the iterative nature of Delphi, it can last for months, therefore, it is critical that all
individuals are available for the entire duration. This became a large problem during this
study as will be discussed later.
Discounting the future.
Many times a discount rate is applied to distant future forecasts. This occurs since
individuals perceive potential near-term crisis situations as more significant than those
several years away. However, this rate is different for each individual and therefore, may
skew the final results (Linstone, 1978). However, it was thought that this would not be a
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problem for this study since the data being collected revolved around near future or even
current events facing the experts. Consequently, there was less potential for any discount
rate to be applied to the responses.
Urge to simplify.
When considering the future, people tend to focus on a small number of potential
innovations and overlay them onto a familiar structure context from the past or present.
This leads to a visualized future situation that does not consider the pervasive influence of
change. Therefore, "intuitive procedures such as Delphi depend heavily on subjective
probability assessments" (Linstone, 1978). This subjective element can lead to experts
confusing desirability and familiarity with probability, which translates into them selecting
options with recognizable elements even though there is very little evidence to support
such a forecast (Tversky, 1974).
Illusory expertise.
This problem occurs when the selected experts are unable to escape from their
current thinking paradigm. Any forecast they provide might only be a view of incremental
improvements made in their area of expertise and not potentially dramatic or fundamental
improvements in the overall process (Linstone, 1978). This problem can be intensified
through the use of inbreeding, which occurs when a panel member is asked to suggest the
names of other possible participants. For this study, experts were selected from a variety
of sources. Therefore, it was hoped that this effect was minimized.
Questionnaire Construction
Construction problems are present in almost any data collection process based on
questionnaires (Dooley, 1995). One of these problems is format bias, which is the
assumption that everyone completing the survey has a certain cultural background.
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Therefore, those with significantly different backgrounds find it more difficult to respond.
However, for this study it was thought that due to the homogeneity of the selected experts
and the narrowly defined population, this bias was not a significant factor.
Item construction is another problem that can be introduced when questions are
unclear or badly worded, when compound items are used or when the options of a closedended question become confusing. This problem was addressed by having research
committee members review and comment on the survey. In addition, a questionnaire
examination was performed to help ensure that all questions were properly worded, easy
to understand, and had only one possible interpretation.
Order effects can also taint the result of a questionnaire. These are introduced
when earlier items bias the responses to later ones. One method to help combat this
problem, is to randomize the order of the questions. However, "this does not guarantee
true responses to the items in their different orders" (Dooley, 1995). Therefore, this study
applied the results of previous research, which shows it is best to start with more general,
less threatening questions that are more interesting to the respondents and progress slowly
into the more specific areas. This ordering was based on the author's subjective opinion
of each question. Care was taken to ensure that questions, which tested the same factor,
were not located next to each other. This was accomplished by coding each question
based on the item it tested, listing the questions in the order presented and verifying that
similarly coded questions were not adjacent to each other.
Guiding the results.
This problem is encountered when the responses to the previous round are altered
by the administrators in the hope of herding the next round in a desired direction. This
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problem was minimized by the active participation of committee members in selecting the
questions for each successive round. It can also be said that the authors had no stake in
the results of the study.
Selection of Organziations
For this study, the population of interest was the Department of Defense,
Department of the Air Force and Department of Defense intelligence community agencies.
For the purpose of this paper the term "agency" will be used as a global reference to each
entity.
A sampling frame was generated from this population using a two-stage approach.
First, participation was limited to agencies within 40 miles of the metropolitan Washington
D.C. area. This population reduction helped keep the data collection convenient and
minimized travel costs. The next sample was drawn by personally contacting the office of
the CIO, or other IT outsourcing decision authority, for each participating agency. A brief
explanation of the study and its purpose was then given followed by a request to
participate. Since the concentration of Government agencies within the selected locales is
so high, there was little concern that the desired number of participating agencies would
not be realized.
As with other Delphi studies, the desired number of participating agencies for this
study was seven for two reasons (Linstone, 1978). First, as shown in Figure 8, groups
smaller than this exhibit quickly decreasing exponential effects on average group error
rate, but higher values show only a shallow monotonic like decrease.
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Figure 8. Group Size vs. Error Rate (Dalkey, 1969:11)
Second, as seen in Figure 8, any group of seven or greater has a sufficiently high reliability
measure. Reliability refers to the degree to which observed scores are free from errors of
measurement (Dooley, 1999). It can be considered how consistent the scores on parallel
forms of a test are or how different items in an instrument test the same measure. "For
example, two sets of measurements on the same variable for the same individual may not
have exactly the same value; however, repeated measurements of a series of individuals
will show some consistency" (Courtois, 1994,37). Measurement theory suggests that the
higher number of items, the more reliable the measure (Dooley, 1999). However, this is
true only if the items have consistency and high inter-item reliability. For the purpose of a
Delphi study, reliability is the likelihood that two different groups, comprised of similarly
qualified participants, will arrive at the same conclusion. Figure 9, was developed by
randomly selecting pairs of variously sized groups and "correlating the median responses
of the pairs on twenty questions" (Dalkey, 1969).
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Selection of Experts
The selection of the experts in a Delphi study is critical and varies among
application. It is especially important when considering IT outsourcing issues since
research has shown that different groups within an organization can view IT outsourcing
differently (Gefen, 1998). As listed above, these experts were selected using a
stratification approach. At the beginning of the study, ten members had agreed to
participate. Table 2 below lists them along with each round they contributed to.
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Table 2. Study Participants
Agency

Position
CIO
CIO
CIO
Deputy CIO
Deputy CIO
Deputy CIO
Deputy CIO
CIO Advisor
Deputy
director of
Communicati
ons
Acquisition
Operations
Director

IC agency #1
IC agency #2
Federally Funded
Research and
Development Center
(FFRDC)
IC agency #3
IC agency #4
IC agency #5
Office of the Secretary
of the Air Force
FFRDC / IC agency #1

Expert #
3
4

Participated in:
Round #1 Round #2 Round #3
X
X
X
X

9

X

X

X

7
1
2

X
X
X

X

X

X

X

5

X

10

X

X

X

IC agency #1

8

X

X

X

Office of the Secretary
of Defense

6

X

X

X

As can be seen, each participant was assigned a number. This helped keep the responses
confidential. To re-enforce the strategic flavor of this study, the two FFRDC participants
were at the chief scientist and vice president level, two participants were general
management (GM)-15's, one was a an Air Force Lieutenant Colonel, two were senior
executive service/senior intelligence service (SES/SIS)-3's, two were SES/SIS-4's and
one was an SES/SIS-5.
It is conceivable that by agreeing to participate in this study a sampling bias could
have been introduced. This would occur if one potential expert accepted or declined to
participate for reasons not applicable to other members. Examples of these reasons
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include over tasking, prior commitments, and disinterest in the study. However, it was
believed that these reasons are the same for each agency and therefore, uniform
throughout the sampling frame. Consequently, the chances of an agency not participating
can be considered random.
The optimum mix of experts included the proper number of stakeholders, experts and
facilitators. Stakeholders are those who are directly affected by the decisions, experts are
those who have an applicable specialty or relevant experience, and facilitators are those
who have skills in clarifying, organizing, and synthesizing. While there are no heuristics
for determining the proper ratio of these individuals in a Delphi group, each application
can help drive the proper balance. For this study the "options and interests are clear but
acceptance of direction and action is fractionated." (Scheele, 1975,68). Research has
shown that in this situation it is not inappropriate for stakeholders to dominate a group
(Scheele, 1975). For this research, stakeholders are usually the CIO of an agency.
However, since expert and facilitator opinion was still welcomed, if a CIO wished to send
a technical representative in their stead, it was not declined.
Development of the Data Gathering Instrument
Each instrument was a questionnaire developed to determine (in order of priority)
1) if the proposed theory was accurate; 2) if it was not, where; 3) offer a refined version of
the theory. Each questionnaire had two portions. The first was a set of closed-ended
descriptive and prescriptive questions that satisfied the first and second objectives. The
descriptive questions used a five-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree to
strongly agree for the question; amount of consideration given. The prescriptive
questions used the same scale for the question; level of agreement. All the questions were
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structured to mirror the proposed relationship that exists between the determinants they
were testing for and the dependent variable; amount of outsourcing
The second portion helped satisfy the third objective of the questionnaire by
providing open-ended questions that allowed the experts to propose different ideas or
explain any anomalous responses.
Round One Questionnaire
The first survey helped form a baseline consensus of the working theory. As
shown in Appendix A, the closed-ended questions helped to quantitatively establish the
acceptance of the theory, while the open-ended questions helped guide the development of
new questions for the second round. If for instance, a determinant was omitted in the first
round instrument, but listed as an important factor by one of the experts, it was included in
the next round.
Results and Formulation of the Second Questionnaire
The second survey was based on the responses obtained from the first. This
progression, as defined by Delphi procedures, helped further define what the strengths and
weakness of the theory were and proposed new ideas based on the responses to the openended questions.
The second questionnaire was exactly the same as the first except for the inclusion of
new factors suggested by the participants and the removal of the lower scoring items.
Determining which factors had the lowest score was done by averaging the answers for
each item and establishing a threshold value. In this case, the value selected was 3.00.
While the selection of this number was somewhat arbitrary, it is consistent with pervious

56

studies (Scheffler, 1999). Additionally, it allowed for a convenient reduction of
approximately 50% in the total number of questions.
It should be noted that all calculations were performed at an item level. Therefore, the
removal of any questions was conducted independent of the factors they were associated
with. Consequently, it was possible for one item from a factor to remain in subsequent
rounds, even though all other questions associated with that category might have been
deleted. Of course if this occurred, it might suggest that such factors were less important
than factors that retained most of their items through the rounds. This process was used
to prevent the deletion of an important category or item simply because they may have
been incorrectly associated with each other.
Round Two Questionnaire
During the second round, each participant was given statistical feedback based on
the previous survey. As shown in Appendix B, the mean of each remaining closed-ended
question was provided as well as the respondents previous score.
Also each member that provided a response greater than 1.25 standard deviation
away from the group average was asked to comment on it. It was hoped that this would
help determine if these answers were based on information the entire group should be
aware of, or if it was an issue applicable only to a specific agency. Any information this
process uncovered that was deemed appropriate to bring to the attention of the entire
group, was included in the third questionnaire
Round Three Questionnaire
Research and empiricism has show that after three iterations any additional
consensus obtained within an expert group will be negligible (Dickson, 1984). Therefore,

57

it was expected that this round would capture the final analytical theory. However, since
additional consensus is negligible after three rounds, it is difficult to determine a priori
when consensus will be reached.
For this reason, some have proposed that consensus in a Delphi should not
necessarily be measured by the percentage of votes that fall within a prescribed range, but
rather the stability of the respondents' vote distribution curve over successive rounds
(Scheibe, 1975). A marginal change of less than 15 percent offers a useful definition of
stability. It has been noted that if a round provides less than a 15 percent change from the
preceding round, the exercise should be stopped (Scheibe, 1975).
For this study, consensus will be measured by the standard deviation and
interquartile range (IQR) of the responses. These statistics will be plotted to show the
trend towards perfect consensus (standard deviation = 0)
Testing of the Data collection Instrument
Faculty Review
Each questionnaire was assessed by the academic advisor of this research to
determine if the item's were clear and focused and whether the instrument possessed
content validity. This individual was familiar with the domain and able to help edit the
questions to help avoid misinterpretations by the respondents.
Questionnaire Examination
To help ensure that the instrument would function as intended, it was the subject
of a comprehensive review. The main purpose of this assessment was to determine if the
instrument exhibited proper item construction. The questions and instructions were
inspected for typographical errors, readability, multiple interpretations, order effect, and
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whether they were understandable. The participants for this review included members of
the March 2001 graduate information management (GIR)/graduate information systems
(GIS) class at the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT).
The review used a two-phased approach. During the first phase, two students
were asked to examine the instrument. Once their comments were considered and
included, the procedure was repeated with two different students.
Distribution of Data Gathering Instrument
To help minimize inadvertent transfer of information outside of the expert group
(Dalkey, 1969) the first questionnaire was hand delivered to each participant along with a
cover letter and specific instructions on how to complete it. These items are included in
Appendix A. The last two surveys were delivered via electronic facsimile transmission
(fax) or electronic message (e-mail) with updated cover letters and instructions. These are
shown in Appendix B and C respectively. It was requested that all completed
questionnaires either be faxed to the study's dedicated fax number, mailed, or e-mailed
back.
Data Processing
Data processing was performed using Microsoft Excel. Immediately after a survey
was returned, the results were entered into an Excel spreadsheet. One main area of
analysis was the summation of the Likert data into mean, standard deviation and IQR data.
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IV. Data Descriptions and Analysis
Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to provide the results of the Delphi study. An
overview of each round will be presented along with examples of the data. A complete
listing of all the raw data for each of the three rounds can be found in Appendix D, E, and
F.
Round One
The first objective for the round one was to roughly determine which of the
proposed determinants from the literature search were most applicable. The second was
to use open-ended questions to obtain any additional items from the experts, not specified
in the literature. Typically, in the first round of a Delphi experiment the participants will
list items that they feel are most important to the research questions. However, since
round one started with the list generated by the literature search, open-ended questions
were included in the survey to allow the respondents to include any other items they
thought were important. The scale for this, and all subsequent rounds, was a five-point
Likert scale.
Results
After a participant submitted a completed questionnaire, the responses were
entered into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. An average and standard deviation were then
calculated for each item. Table 3 below shows an example of the spreadsheet used for
this. Here, the first four responses from experts #1 and #2 are displayed along with the
resulting average and standard deviation for those items. The naming convention used to
identify study questions in the surveys, is table number followed by question number. As
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an example, T1-01 is table one, question one and T2-01 is table two, question one.
However, since there are a different number of questions in each round, most items will
have a different number assigned to them for each. Therefore, for ease of reading, all
questions have been re-coded to a universal numbering scheme for presentation in the text.
However, it should be noted that the survey's themselves will retain their original number
convention. For clarification purposes, Appendix G contains an inter-round question
numbering map that matches any question in the surveys to its universal code.
Table 3. Example of Raw Data
Question #

Expert #1

Expert #2

Avg

Std Dev

3.8

1.135

3.8

1.398

4.1

1.197

3.667

0.866

Following the mean and standard deviation calculations, the data were reordered
based on the sub-factors to make the results easier to work with. To accomplish this, each
sub-factor was assigned an alphanumeric designator based on its associated factor. For
example, the first cost sub-factor, cost reduction, was given the designator Cl, the
second, improved cost controls, was given C2, and so on. The data were then sorted
based on these designators. An example for expert #1 and #2 is listed in Table 4.
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Table 4. Example of Data Sorted Based on Item Type
Question # Item Type

Expert #1

Expert #2

Avg

Std Dev

2.111

0.928

2.889

1.364

29

T6

3

1

44

T6

4

l

28

T7

2

4

3.100

1.197

35

T7

4

3

3.889

1.167

...

...

...

...

...

...

...

During the analysis it was determined that questions associated with the business
factors inability to write an adequate service level agreement and inability to manage a
contract had been incorrectly phrased. Both of these factors are a risk. However, the
questions were worded as if they were benefits. The average responses to these questions
were high, consequently they should have been retained. Yet, when it is considered that
they should have been phrased to elicit the opposite response, an argument is formed that
the responses should have been low, which would have caused their average scores to fall
below the threshold value and result in the item being removed from future rounds. To be
conservative, all questions associated with these two factors were re-worded in a negative
manner to reflect the risk factor they were testing for. These questions were then included
in the second questionnaire.
A complete listing of the remaining data ranked by mean is presented in Table 5.
Figure 10 is a plot of each of the mean scores based on the rank of the question. As
shown by the r-squared value of 0.97, the continuum of these values is very linear.
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Formulation of Second Questionnaire
Before beginning the process of determining which questions would be retained for
the second questionnaire, each response was first tested to determine if it fell 1.25
standard deviations from the mean. These results would later be combined with the final
set of retained questions so a respondent would have an opportunity to comment on why
they felt their response might have been exceptionally high or low. This number was
selected since it was the lowest value that still allowed each participant at least one
opportunity to provide feedback.
Following this, a threshold value of 3.00 was applied to each items average. All
averages above the threshold were retained for the next round, while all those below were
deleted. As mentioned earlier, while the selection of this number was somewhat arbitrary,
it is consistent with pervious studies (Scheffler, 1999). Additionally, it allowed for a
convenient reduction of approximately 50% in the total number of questions, retaining 43
out of the original 83. The retained questions were then automatically combined along
with each participants previous response and whether it was above or below the defined
number of deviations. Table 6, lists the first 7 questions retained for the second survey
along with their alphanumeric designators (Type), averages (Avg), standard deviations
(Std D), boundaries for selected minimum and maximum standard deviations (1.25),
respondent #1, round one answers (1-Ans), indicator of whether respondent #l's answers
were above or below the preset minimum and maximum standard deviation value of 1.25
(1-Out), respondent #2, round one answers (2-Ans), and finally an indicator of whether
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respondent #2's answers were above or below the preset minimum and maximum standard
deviation value of 1.25 (2-Out).
Table 6. Sub-set of Questions Selected for Second Survey
Question #

Type

Avg

StdD

1.25

1.25

1-Ans

01
11
14
39
18
12
33

Fl
Fl
F2
F2
F3
F4
F4
...

3.800
3.800
4.000
3.000
3.100
3.400
3.200
...

1.135
1.229
0.471
0.866
0.876
1.075
1.135
...

5.219
5.337
4.589
4.083
4.194
4.744
4.619
...

2.381
2.263
3.411
1.917
2.006
2.056
1.781
...

4
3
4
3
3
3
2
...

1-Out

...

2-Ans 2-Out
3
4
3
3
2
3
4
...

...
Low
Low

...

...

...

To ensure that the spreadsheet was calculating the correct values, over 20% of the
final 43 questions were selected at random and verified by hand calculations.
Informal feedback from the first questionnaire showed that some participants
thought the flow of the instrument was rough. They thought it did not read well and was
therefore difficult to follow and respond to. This was anticipated due to the tight
adherence to guidelines used to minimize order effect. However, for the second survey it
was thought that these guidelines could be relaxed. Consequently, the questions were
reordered to present those testing for benefits first followed by those testing for risks.
These categories were further ordered based on the presentation of the theory in chapter
two. It was hoped that this would produce a smoother flowing instrument.
As previously mentioned, open ended questions were included in the survey to
allow each participant to add additional factors they thought were important to an
outsourcing decision. When an individual provided a response to one of these questions,
it was entered into a separate file and if necessary, edited so that it was easier to
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...

understand. Each new question was then categorized as either having a positive or
negative relationship on the decision to outsourcing. As previously mentioned, those with
a positive relationship were labeled as a benefit and those with a negative relationship
were labeled as a risk. This allowed the questions to be ordered using the new process
listed above.
Following this, an attempt was made to match each of the new items to an already
theorized sub-factor. This was done to more easily track the questions through future
rounds. If the question was able to matched, the appropriate alphanumeric designator was
simply assigned to the new item. If a new question could not be easily mapped to an
existing factor, a new factor was created. An N precedes the designator for any new subfactor. This process was then reviewed by advisors to ensure that it any miscategorizations were minimized. Each new item was then assigned a number based on the
universal code previously described. For these new items the numbering was simply
continued from the last item. However, to denote that these were new questions, an N
precedes each of their assigned numbers. Table 7 presents a complete listing of the 14
new items added to the second questionnaire along with their assigned alphanumeric
designators and numbers. The only item that could not be assigned to an already
theorized factor was a suggestion regarding best industry practices and improved process.
For this item a category labeled as additional was developed. Since this was a new
category, this item was given the designator NA1 as shown.
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Table 7. New Questions
Question

New question

#
N84
N85
N86
N87
N88
N89
N90
N91
N92
N93
N94
N95
N96
N97

Table #1:
Congressional Interest
Create agency wide business practice
Ability of IT outsourcing to make interoperability between systems LANs
better
Quality of Intra-agency relationships (between IT and business units)
Lack of a clearly delineated set of systems, costs and service levels
Controlling different security levels of data without security incident
Table #2:
I believe that many agencies feel that outsourcing is either mandated or so
strongly encouraged as to be, in essence mandated
believe that many senior IT managers see outsourcing as an end in itself
rather than a strategy to achieve a goal
I believe outsourcing activities are not initiated by IT organizations. External
actors loom large in decisions
I believe some IT managers view outsourcing as a means to adopt industry
best practices and improve processes
I believe some IT managers view outsourcing as a means to mitigate the
inability of government to remove incompetent IT workers
I believe the cost of outsourcing is not clearly understood
I believe outsourcing should not be done without a comprehensive business
assessment to establish value
I believe managers do not determine best value prior to outsourcing

Item
Type
B2
F2
T3
NE1
B4
S2
B2
B2
NE2
NA1
B4
F5
F5
F5

A complete list of all factors, sub-factors, and associated alphanumeric designators are
presented in Appendix H.
Round Two
The second round had five objectives. The first was to retest the subset of
questions developed from round one in the hopes of gaining consensus. The second was
to retest the business related items that were reworded. The third was to test any new
questions developed as a result of the responses to the open ended questions in the first
round. The fourth objective was to obtain comments from the experts if their previous
response fell more than 1.25 standard deviations from the mean and the fifth was to obtain
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any new items from open-ended questions. The scale used on this survey was the same
five point Likert Scale used in the first round.

Results
The raw data collected from this questionnaire was entered and reduced in nearly the
same manner as the first survey. The only difference was that the data did not need to be
reordered, since it was already grouped based on sub-factors.
Also, as anticipated, the newly worded version of the questions relating to the inability
to write an adequate service level agreement and inability to manage a contract almost
all had an average value substantially lower than even the first survey's threshold of 3.0.
Yet, it should be noted that three of these items did score at or above the threshold.
However, these items did not directly test the relationship between the proposed subfactors and the dependent variable, but rather simply tested for the existence of the subfactor as it relates to the dependent variable. While this may prove useful for future
research, it was decided that since the proposed relationship between these sub-factors
and the dependent variable had already been rejected, no further investigation in this area
was warranted.
A listing of the 57 questions asked in round two are presented in a rank order format
in Table 8. This table includes the 43 question retained from the first round along with the
14 new items suggested by the experts. Table 9 displays the same information for the reworded questions described above.
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Formulation of Third Questionnaire
The responses were again tested to determine if responses fell outside a defined
number of standard deviations. The selected number of standard deviations was again
1.250. When this was performed, a much smaller number of them fell outside the range as
compared to the first round and many of those that did were for the same questions that
were previously out of the range. Therefore, for these reasons, it was decided that in the
next round the respondent would not be asked to comment on why their response may
have been exceptionally high or low.
Once the means, standard deviations, and IQRs were calculated, a threshold of
3.714 was applied. This forced a reduction in the number of questions from 43 to 23.
When this was performed, eight of the 14 new questions produced from responses to the
first rounds open-ended questions remained.
To determine if consensus was being achieved, the change in standard deviations
for the remaining questions that were asked in both the first and second rounds were
plotted as shown in Figure 11. In this plot, consensus would display itself as a decrease in
the standard deviations for each item with perfect consensus being represented by a
standard deviation of zero (Dickson, 1984).
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Figure 11. Standard Deviations for Rounds 1-2
It can be seen, however, that the standard deviation for 10 of the 15 questions
went up. These results were even more confounding when the interquatile range (IQR)
was plotted for the same items. IQR is the difference between the third quartile rank score
and the first quartile rank score and can be used as another measure of consensus
(Dickson, 1984). Figure 12 shows that the IQR for many items went down even when
their corresponding standard deviations went up.
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Figure 12. Interquartile Range for Rounds 1-2
In an attempt to explain this phenomenon, the stability of each item was analyzed.
This measurement attempts to maximize the utility of the voting results by determining the
constancy of each individual's responses over successive rounds (Scheibe, 1975). If
stability exists without consensus being formed, it might be an indicator that unconsensual
distributions or other anomalies exist that would preclude consensus from being formed
further. To calculate the stability, the histograms were subtracted columnwise and the
absolute value of the result taken. Table 10 shows this calculation for item number 1 and
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Table 10. Example of Stability Measurement Calculation in Round Two
Item #1

Questionnaire #1 response
Questionnaire #2 response

Histograms
Questionnaire #1
Questionnaire #2
Absolute difference between rounds 1-2
Rating
Total units of change
Net person-changes
Number of participants
Percent change

1
3
3

2
4
4

Expert Response
6
3
4
5
5
4

4
4

Bins
4
3

5

3
4
1

2
1
1

4
4

5

7
1
1

T

2
Ö

l
0

0
0

l
0

2

Expert Response
6
3
4
5

7

5
5

2
2

1

7

2
1
7
14.29%

Item #7
1
3
2

Questionnaire #1 response
Questionnaire #2 response

4
5

5
5

4
4

4
5

Bins
4
3

5

Histograms

1

2

Questionnaire #1

0

1

1

3

2

Questionnaire #2
Absolute difference between rounds 1-2

0
0

2
1

0
1

1
2

4
2

Rating
6
3
7
42.86%

Total units of change
Net person-changes
Number of participants
1 Percent change

As shown, the absolute values of the difference between histograms are added to
determine the total units of change. Since any one participant's change of opinion is
reflected in the histogram difference by two units of change, net person-changes are
computed by dividing total units of change by two. Finally, the percentage change is
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determined by dividing net changes by the number of participants (Scheibe, 1975).
Typically, a change of less than 15% represents a state of equilibrium. "Any two
distribution that show marginal changes of less than 15% may be said to have reached
stability" (Sheibe, 1975; 278). With only 7 respondents, this becomes a very rigorous test
since only items with net-person changes of one or below will pass.
The results of these calculations for each of the 15 questions asked in the first two
rounds, and retained for the third, are present below in Table 11. This table also annotates
if the standard deviation of the question went up or down between the rounds.
Table 11. Stability Measurements for Questions Retained for Survey Three
Question
i
3
7
11
14
19
23
26
40
43
66
73
77
80
81

Stability
14.29%
14.29%
42.86%
28.57%
14.29%
14.29%
0.00%
14.29%
14.29%
14.29%
28.57%
28.57%
28.57%
14.29%
14.29%

Std Dev (up or down)
Up
Up
Down
Up
Up
Up
Up
Up
Up
Up
Down
Down
Down
Down
Up

As shown, all but one of the questions whose standard deviation went up (11) exhibited a
stability less than 15%. Additionally, four out of the five questions whose standard
deviation went down had a stability of greater than 15%. From these results, its evident
that those questions whose standard deviations went up between rounds one and two had
reached stability. Further, those questions whose standard deviation went down had not
stabilized. Therefore, based on the fact that stability had not been achieved in five items
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and that eight out of 14 questions selected for the third questionnaire were new to the
second round and therefore had only been asked once, it was decided to proceed with the
third round.
All comments provided by the experts, if their previous response to a question was
above or below 1.25 standard deviations, were then typed into a separate list. The specific
comment, expert, and whether their previous answer was above or below the prescribed
range, was annotated on the list. This made it easier to group similar ideas and find
common themes.
As previously mentioned, the last objective of round two was to again use openended questions to obtain from the experts any additional items they thought might be
important to include in the model. However, during this round only one respondent
provided any suggestions. After faculty review, these were deemed to already be part of
the model and had been already been tested for. Consequently, no additional
consideration was given to this issue.
Round Three
The third round had three objectives. The first was to gain further consensus or
stability on items previously tested in rounds one and two. The second was to show
consensus or stability on items added to the instruments as a result of expert feedback in
round two and the third objective was to determine the highest rated items. The scale
used on this survey was the same five point Likert Scale used in the first two rounds.

Results
The raw data collected from this questionnaire was entered and reduced in the same
manner as the second survey. However, since another questionnaire was not planned, any

79

calculations used to determine the items for the next questionnaire were not required. A
listing of the 23 questions asked in round three is presented in a rank order format in Table
12.
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Analysis and Findings
As previously mentioned, standard deviation and IQR are two common measures
of consensus. Consequently, these statistics were computed for each of the items in this
round and plotted along with the same data from round one and two as shown in Figure
11 and 12. As seen in Figure 13 below, the general trend for the standard deviations from
round two to three did not increase as they did from round one to two. However, they
only exhibited a slight decrease.
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Figure 13. Standard Deviations for Rounds 1-3
In an attempt to explain this, the stability of each item was again considered to
determine if the predictions had solidified. Similar to Table 11, Table 13 displays the
stability trends from round one to two and two to three. Note that item 19 is no longer
listed. During final review it was determined that the wrong question was attached to this
items feedback statistics in the second and third round questionnaires. Therefore, it was
discarded. A closer analysis of this issue, however, did suggest that the Delphi process
was at work. This issue will be discussed more fully in the next chapter.
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Table 13. Stability Measurements for Survey Three Questions

Question

Stability between
Rounds 1 and 2

1
3
7
11
14
23
26
40
43
66
73
77
80
81

14.29%
14.29%
14.29%
28.57%
14.29%
14.29%
0.00%
42.86%
14.29%
28.57%
28.57%
28.57%
14.29%
14.29%

Std Dev (up or
down) between
rounds 1 and 2
Up
Up
Up
Up
Up
Up
Up
Down
Up
Down
Down
Down
Down
Up

Stability between
Rounds 2 and 3
14.29%
14.29%
14.29%
14.29%
0.00%
14.29%
14.29%
14.29%
14.29%
14.29%
14.29%
14.29%
42.86%
14.29%

Std Dev (up or
down) between
rounds 2 and 3
Down
Up
Down
Up
Up
Down
Equal
Down
Down
Down
Down
Down
Down
Down

As shown in Table 13, eight out of nine items whose standard deviation went
down, all three items whose standard deviations went up, and one item whose standard
deviation remained the same all had stabilities lower than 15%. These results help show
that the responses from the expert group had stabilized and that consensus had been
achieved. This argument is reinforced by the fact that all interquartile range values were
one or lower in round three, as seen if Figure 14.
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Figure 14. Interquartile Range for Rounds 1-3
This decrease also signifies that consensus has been reached for these items (Schiebe,
1975).
As previously mentioned, the second objective of round three was to show
consensus or stability for items added to the instruments as a result of expert feedback in
round two. Figure 15 shows the standard deviation of these items from round two to
three.
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Figure 15. Standard Deviations for New Items between Rounds 2-3
Clearly, the trend for these items is downward, again, showing the drive towards a
perfect consensus number of zero (Dickson, 1984). This assessment is reinforced by the
changes in the interquartile ranges for these items as shown in Figure 16 below.
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Figure 16. Interquartile Range for New Items between Rounds 2-3
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Again, this plot also shows a downward trend. In fact, all these items have an IQR of less
than one, which could indicate consensus had already been formed. However, the stability
numbers for these items listed in Table 14 do not support that viewpoint.
Table 14. Stability of New Questions
New Question

Stability

N85
N88
N89
N92
N93
N95
N96
N97

42.86%
0.00%
14.29%
42.86%
42.86%
57.14%
14.29%
28.57%

With five out of eight stability measurements about 15%, it is difficult to state that
stability has been achieved for these items.
Round three's final objective was to determine the highest rated items in the study.
The top ten highest rated items are shown in Table 15. These items were generated by
applying a threshold value of 4.142 to the results from round three. Only ten were
selected since it is a small, convenient sample which most people are accustomed to
dealing with.
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Table 15. Top Ten Highest Rated Items
Question
Number
23
26
N96

73
N95

77

43
81
N92

Rank

Question

Average

Improve quantity or quality of agency outputs
Productivity improvements
I believe outsourcing should not be done
without a comprehensive business assessment
to establish value
I believe some IT managers outsource to
eliminate a troublesome function that is "not
worth the headaches"
I believe the cost of outsourcing is not clearly
understood
I believe some IT managers attempt to
convince senior managers that their internal
IT departments can perform the same
services an outside vendor can perform for
the same amount or less
Improve technical services (e.g.
dissatisfaction with current, in-house IT
support)
Security concerns over how vendors handle
agency data on their own systems
I believe the more other government agencies
outsource their IT, the more mine might
I believe outsourcing activities are not
initiated by IT organizations. External actors
loom large in decisions

4.571
4.571

Item
Type
Bl
Bl

4.571

F5

4.429

P4

4.286

F5

4.286

PI

4.286

Tl

4.143

S2

4.143

E2

4.143

NE2

Summary
This chapter has detailed what the highest ranked items in the question were, how
they where determined and whether consensus on them was achieved. The next chapter
will use these results to investigate any relationships between, and within the factors.
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V. Findings and Conclusions
Introduction
This chapter is broken into three sections. The first provides a macro perspective
of the results by discussing how each factor relates to the others. The second portion
provides a micro perspective by focusing within individual factors and attempts to explain
and reconcile the results based on the comments received from the expert group in the
second survey. The third section lists any limitations of the research and suggests possible
follow on activities.
Macro Perspective
When considering the importance of the factors relative to each other, it is helpful
to consider the percentage of questions retained from the first round to the last. This
measure gives a crude estimate of what factors are most important. Table 16 summarizes
this information by presenting how many questions were associated with each factor and
how many were retained for the last round. The percentages for each were then
calculated and ranked. The total number of questions listed was determined by adding the
total number of original questions plus any additional items suggested by the experts. It
should be noted that the entirely new factor best practices and improved process (NA1)
was not considered in this table. For clarification purposes, Table 17 lists the number of
first round questions along with the specific questions added and their assigned
alphanumeric designator.
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Table 16. Number of Questions Retained from Round One to Three
First to Third Round
Number of Questions

Retained
(Percentage retained)

17
35
14
12
10

7 (41%)
4 (13%)
3 (21%)
3 (25%)
2 (20%)
3 (38%)

FACTORS
Financial
Business
Technical
Political
Security
Environmental

Ranking of % retained

Table 17. Number of Questions

Factor

Number
of
questions
in round 1

Financial

13

Business

30

Technical

13

Political

12

Security

Environmental

Additional questions included in round 2
1. Create agency wide business practice (F2)
2.1 believe the cost of outsourcing is not clearly
understood (F5)
3.1 believe outsourcing should not be done without a
comprehensive business assessment to establish value (F5)
4.1 believe managers do not determine best value prior to
outsourcing (F5)
1. Congressional Interest (B2)
2. Lack of a clearly delineated set of systems, costs and
service levels (B4)
3.1 believe that many agencies feel that outsourcing is
either mandated or so strongly encouraged as to be, in
essence mandated (B2)
4.1 believe that many senior IT managers see outsourcing
as an end in itself rather than a strategy to achieve a goal
(B2)
5.1 believe some IT managers view outsourcing as a
means to mitigate the inability of government to remove
incompetent IT workers (B4)
1. Ability of IT outsourcing to make interoperability
between systems LANs better (T3)
No questions added
1. Controlling different security levels of data without
security incident (S2)
1. Quality of Intra-agency relationships (between IT and
business units) (NE1)
2.1 believe outsourcing activities are not initiated by IT
organizations. External actors loom large in decisions
(NE2)

Final total
number of
questions
asked

17

35

14
12
10

8

***The question "I believe some IT managers view outsourcing as a means to adopt industry
best practices and improve processes (NA1)" was not included ***

89

From Table 16, it seems that financial factors were the most important
determinants to the population. This result is not surprising considering some have labeled
this factor the most important advantage provided by outsourcing (Rebeiro, 1996).
Additionally, its been shown that reduced costs are one of the largest motivators behind
the use of IT outsourcing in the government (Jones, 1999).

As mentioned in chapter

two, cost reductions were repeatedly labeled the number one reason why outsourcing
solutions should be pursued during the interviews conducted for this research. In fact, one
respondent casually remarked, "is there another reason you would outsource?" (Folsom,
2000). A government Chief Information Officer (CIO) has even been quoted that when it
comes to outsourcing, "cost is THE driver" (Jones, 1999:29).
The second most important factor seemed to be environmental determinants, while
the third were the political items. Considering the political nature of any public firm, this
result is not surprising. Additionally, the fact that these two factors were ranked
successively might suggest that they are closely related. It is possible that since the
environment that public firms operate in is inherently political, there might be a correlation
between these two factors. In a close tie for four and fifth place are technical and security
items respectively. However, the lower rankings of these items should probably not be
viewed as a lack of concern for such issues. As an example, expert #6 expressed his
organizations technical focus by commenting, "our concern is with providing availability
of IT services - we seek 99.975% network availability. We also want to increase overall
desktop availability to 99.975% for average users and 99.99% for executive users." Such
goals seem to be consistent with the wishes and desires of many other DoD organizations
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(AFIT, 2000). These users seem to feel that the first priority of any DoD IT organization
should be to provide network service that is as reliable as a telephone.
The least important factor seemed to be business. If this result seems surprising,
one could argue that it was simply because the business factor had more sub-factors to test
for and consequently had more that could be rejected. A good example of this are the 10
re-tested items that were all rejected in the second round. However, Table 18 shows that
even when these 10 items are not considered, the business factor did not rate much higher.
Also, as will be shown later, while the business factor as a whole did not rate very high,
several individual business sub-factors did.
Table 18 presents a more detailed look of the same data by delineating how many
questions were originally associated with each factor in the first and second round as well
as how many were retained for the next. The percentages for each were then calculated
and ranked. As in Table 16, the number of questions listed in the second to third round
includes any additional items or sub-factors added by the experts. Also, as noted in the
chapter four, the 10 Business related questions that needed to be rephrased and retested
from the first to second rounds are not included since there is difficulty determining which
round to assign them to. This table also does not include the single additional factor
tested for in the second round relating to best practices and policies.
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Table 18. Number of Questions Retained from Round One to Two and Two
to Three
Second to Third Round

First to Second Round
Number of
Questions

Retained
(Percentage
retained)

Ranking of
% retained

Number of
Questions

Retained
(Percentage
retained)

Ranking of
% retained

13
20
13
12
9
6

9( 69%)
10 (50%)
9 (69%)
3 (25%)
7 (78%)
5 (83%)

3(tie)
5
3(tie)
6
2
1

13
15
10
3
8
7

7 (54%)
4 (27%)
3 (30%)
3 (50%)
2 (25%)
3 (43%)

1
5
4
2
6
3

FACTORS
Financial
Business
Technical
Political
Security
Environmental

*A11 retested business factors were rejected

* 10 Business factors retested

As shown, while the rankings vary slightly from Table 16, they are consistent with the
results presented there. Business determinants still rank among the lowest items.
However, it should be noted that the last three determinants all fall within 5% of each
other, helping to show that they are equally important.
Another reason why business determinants may have ranked so low is because firms
seem worried they might lose critical skill sets and therefore a competitive edge over their
adversaries. As stated by expert #2, "It is absurd to believe future/long term issues will
not require understanding and recognition that IT is an essential tool for the company's
future well being." He also seems to believe that IT will not simplify the management
agenda since any difficult decision regarding IT will still need to be made internal to the
firm. As he states:
Handing it [IT] over to an outsourcing firm does not absolve the company
from making tough decisions. I don't think the head of an outsourced firm
will be able to simplify key decision making issues any easier than a good
internal IT manager who is respected by, and embraced as part of the
senior management team.
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Expert #10 echoes this feeling when he states, "The level of management that manages the
IT organization (whether in-house or outsourced) would likely remain the same. Why
would someone else doing the work change the management agenda?"
It is also interesting to note, that all factors are strongly represented in Table 16.
This might suggest that while some determinants are more important than others, the
decision to outsource IT in the DoD is a multifaceted one. This viewpoint is even
supported when only the ten highest rated determinants are considered. As seen in Table
15, at least one item from each factor was represented in this list, again demonstrating the
convoluted nature of this decision. The multidimensional character of these results is also
consistent with previous studies. As mentioned in chapter two, most of the existing IT
outsourcing frameworks for the private sector also have a multidimensional flavor (Loh,
1992; Smith, 1998; Gurbaxani, 1996; Lacity, 1994). Perhaps the results of this study are
an indication that private and public sector organizations tend to have similar IT
outsourcing determinants.
Micro Perspective
Each factor was also examined internally for any trends. By focusing on each
factor individually, patterns begin to emerge that provide clues as to why certain experts
may have voted they way they did. In addition, it allows a more comprehensive analysis
of the issues and concerns surrounding each factor. Expert comments were used to help
illustrate these issues and results.
Financial
Table 19 shows the average for each of the questions in the last round along with
their ranking in each. As shown, two of the final top rated items were financial
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determinants. These were / believe outsourcing should not be done without a
comprehensive business assessment to establish value (N96) and I believe the cost of
outsourcing is not clearly understood (N95). Both of these items had consistently high
averages throughout the entire study. It is interesting to note that both came from the
same sub-factor, potential problems with cost reductions (F5).
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Based on this, it seems that DoD IT officials are cautious about the potential for
any cost savings from outsourcing. This seems to be inconsistent with previous studies,
which seemed to suggest that IT outsourcing was performed in the Government almost
exclusively for cost related reasons (Jones, 1999). This apparent contradiction might be
explained by the timing of each of the studies. As a comparison, many private firms also
tended to focus on cost-related determinants early on in their experiences with IT
outsourcing (Rebeiro, 1996). However, as their familiarity with it grew they seemed to
become more skeptical over any potential savings. (Lacity, 1993; Quinn, 1999; Willcocks,
1994). The DoD might simply be experiencing the same evolution. Recent IT
outsourcing studies in the Federal Government show that cost savings occurred for only
the first year or two and that no evidence exists for savings due to economies of scale
(Jones, 1999). This idea is corroborated by the fact that many DoD agencies now seem to
be performing Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) studies, which will hopefully help prove
any potential cost saving before a decision is made to outsource (Cooper, 2000; NSA,
1999). This approach is also being endorsed by the senior managers in several private
firms who believe that to truly determine whether outsourcing will produce cost savings,
all information management activities costs must be known (Martinsons, 1993).
Identifying IT costs is not the only financial objective sought by organizations.
They also seem to be starving for any process that will provide some predictability to their
IT budgets. Some feel that outsourcing can provide this. As expert #6 writes:
In our organization, the true cost of operating our IT is often masked by
various business units using mission money for IT activities. Applications
are stood up by functional users and turned over for maintenance to the IT
shop. The IT shop had no knowledge of this activity and had not budgeted
for maintenance of the servers, software licenses, etc. In a similar vein,
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business units have bought PDA software, and other equipment, not on
configuration but with the expectation of help supporting these items.
Outsourcing would require all IT functions to be procured and supported
through the contractor. These costs would no longer be a surprise to the IT
staff. Business units would have to bear the financial burden of their IT
decisions.
However, there are those who seem to feel that outsourcing is only treating the symptoms
and not curing this disease. As expert #10 suggests, "it is really the internal organization
that has to change." To support this position expert #2 states:
Improving cost controls MAY be an outcome of outsourcing, but it is not
the most important consideration for making an outsourcing decision. If an
organization does not understand how outsourcing will REQUIRE change
to established business practices first, costs may not be controlled any
better than before the outsourcing. In fact, this has been the case for some
corporations who did not first consider the more essential question: will
you allow an outsourced firm to discipline your workforce's IT
consumption?
Expert #9 also seems to express this opinion by stating, "This objective should be
accommodated via fiscal means and not through outsourcing."
Business
As mentioned earlier, the business factor as a whole did not rank very high.
However, as seen in Table 15, two of the three highest rated items were business
determinants. In fact, as shown in Table 19, these two items remained at or near the top
of the ranking in all three rounds. It is also interesting to note that both were from the
focus on core competency (Fl) business sub-factor, suggesting that while business factors
are not considered very much as a whole, this sub-factor is considered heavily when
making a decision to outsource.
It is interesting to note that previous research has shown that DoD organizations
do not consider business determinants much at all when making an IT outsourcing
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decision, but focus exclusively on financial determinants (Jones, 1999). After all, the
financial factor did rank highest. Yet these results would tend to suggest otherwise. As in
the similar financial situation above, this apparent discrepancy might be explained by the
fact that many private firms also tended to focus on financial determinants early on in their
experiences with outsourcing (Rebeiro, 1996). But, as their familiarity with it grew, they
seemed to start thinking more about the business related aspects of the arrangement
(Venkatraman, 1997). Again, the DoD might simply be experiencing this same evolution.
This idea is further strengthened when it is considered that focusing on core competencies
was among the first business determinants considered by private industry.
Based on the comments, there also seems to be a deep concern with a potential
loss of control over IT services. As expert #2 states:
This is a big issue for US Intelligence. There is a real possibility that the
government may lose the expertise to understand technology and related
insight into security issues. The government may lose key expertise of how
other nations may use technology, and thereby, what vulnerabilities exist
for US and foreign systems. This factor demands up front consideration
over what to outsource and what not to outsource; what the legal aspects
may be as related to national security if a company owns aspects of the IT
infrastructure (what are the government's rights to control data); what
happens when a foreign company buys out an outsourcing firm that has
access to national security information; how the government will retain key
skills, etc.
Yet, there are some who feel that this is only a temporary concern, as expert #10 states,
"It's a competitive market now, but it ebbs and flows. This may be the case now but not a
year or two from now."
Technical
Improving technical services also rated high in the survey. As seen in Table 19,
question 26, Productivity improvements, ranked fairly high throughout in all three surveys.
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This item concentrates on improving technical services. However, some feel that
improving services is not the issue. Rather, the issue is improving them within the budget
allotted. As expert #10 wrote, "Our main headache is finding quality IT workers that we
can afford." Consequently, it seems that qualified workers that can increase customer
satisfaction are available, although, paying for them is another issue.
Yet, there are some who feel that any increased service levels provided by
outsourcing are overstated. As expert #10 wrote, "Frequently these are beliefe not based
on actual data. [It is] tough to change beliefs." Based on this, it seems that some
managers and users may simply trust what they have heard about IT outsourcing rather
than investigating it themselves. Expert #2 echoed this position by stating, "Customers
may not be any happier, possibly less so, when an outsourcing firm has total control over
their IT environment and begins to discipline IT customers. They may have less recourse,
other than to grumble."
Additionally, some seemed concerned that vendors don't have the ability to solve
many agency specific requirements. As expert #7 writes, "One of the key issues that
would inhibit one from outsourcing would be concern that a vendor could not meet the
unique requirements (often security related) of my organization." As he points out, many
of these special requirements are security related. This is not surprising given the
classified nature of the data these organizations sometimes handle. Others seem to
counter this claim by proposing that a properly written contract can help minimize these
issues. As expert # 9 writes, "many of the [technical] complications can be mitigated via
contract provisions." In the end, it seems that some are unconvinced that outsourcing IT
can increase user satisfaction.
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It also seems that the influence these issues have on a decision to outsource
depends in large measure as to whether the organization making it is a policy or
operational group. As expert #6 states, "We are a policy shop. We do not have the large
number of integration and system dependencies that an operational environment such as
Army Personnel Command would have."

Political
There were also several political questions that seemed important to the expert
group. As seen in Table 19, questions 77,1 believe some IT managers attempt to
convince senior managers that their internal IT departments can perform the same
services an outside vendor can perform for the same amount or less, and 73, 7. believe
some IT managers outsource to eliminate a troublesome function that is "not worth the
headaches", both ranked high in all three rounds. The first question centers on using IT
outsourcing proposals to prove to senior managers that when compared directly, the
internal team can perform just as good if not better than an outside vendor. As expert #10
wrote:
The fact of outsourcing being better AND cheaper may hold true for a
short period of time. Constraints on the existing organization will also
constrain an outsourced organization. So, if you reduce the constraints,
internal organizations can perform better.
As mentioned, many times the internal team is handicapped by not being allowed to
compete using the same requirement set. As the literature has pointed out, "many IT
departments have equally sophisticated technology and adequate economies of scale but
aren't allowed to adopt the best practices that would help them match or beat a supplier's
bid" (Lacity, 1995: 90). It goes on to state that if a company allows its own IT

100

department to compete with outsourcing vendors, they not only might win the contract
but can also "gain a much deeper understanding of the costs of a given service and the
best way to provide it. If they decide to outsource in the future, they will be in a stronger
position to evaluate bids and to write a contract that serves their own interests" (Lacity,
1995: 91)
Question 73,1 believe some IT managers outsource to eliminate a troublesome
function that is "not worth the headaches", also rated high. This items focuses on an IT
managers desire to simply rid themselves of a difficult and problematic activity. This issue
is anchored to the idea that IT can be a very demanding and sometimes unrewarding
activity. Many times IT administrators do not adequately feel compensated either
emotionally or financially when they have success. In addition, they feel overly targeted
by users when something goes wrong (Lacity, 1994). This can lead to IT managers simply
outsourcing the problem to someone else. Some feel that this approach can also have the
added benefit of focusing the attention of an organizations senior leadership on IT. As
expert #2 wrote,
Some managers, both in IT and at the corporate level would rather toss the
problem over the fence. Have you heard the term, "IT is not part of our
core mission?" This also happens when an IT manager cannot get
corporate support for making tough decisions. By outsourcing the issue,
they force the organization to recognize "troublesome" functions can be
tough to resolve whether run by the government or contractors.
The viewpoint expressed by expert #10 on this issue seems even more basic when he
writes, "I see outsourcing as a management strategy-which would include eliminating a
troublesome function." From this it seems he believes that eliminating a troublesome
function is simply a beneficial by-product of the proper overall management strategy.
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During the initial interviews it also became clear that exposing exaggerated claims
was a potential reason to outsource. In one interview, the CIO of a DoD agency
mentioned that there is big push towards outsourcing IT within the government (Cooper,
2000). This is not surprising considering Congressional language exists stating that
Government agencies shall outsource. However, some agency CIOs have not been
convinced that outsourcing is the panacea others might think it is. Some of these
individuals have been successful at convincing Congressional staffers to allow their
organization to perform outsourcing evaluations to determine exactly how much might
truly be saved if outsourcing were pursued.

Security
As theorized, security was also represented in the top ten list of determinants.
Several experts emphasized the fact that security was an important factor in making a
decision to outsourcing their IT. Expert #6 wrote, "We operate in a highly sensitive and
political environment. Who has access to our data is a concern." Expert #8 echoed this
sentiment by stating, "[We] operate in a high security environment. Every
vendor/contractor must be cleared to this level." Expert #6's comment is also interesting
because it points out that the environment is not just sensitive, but political as well. This
reveals that enemies of the state may not be the only adversaries individuals attempt to
conceal information from As mentioned in chapter two, individuals in public sector
organizations can sometimes base decisions on more personally motivated criteria
(Hancox, 1999).
Yet when it comes to protecting sensitive information, other experts feel that
contract provisions and existing policy are adequate safeguards. As expert #2 writes,
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Not a key decision factor. Rules are written into any contract that will
specify how government information is to be treated. This may require a
company to change their practices. Put the onus on the vendor, make the
vendor support the government's requirement for privacy and security as
part of a selection process. Do not make this an up-front decision—the
extent they currently support adequate privacy.
Expert #2 follows this by stating, "the security screening mitigates this concern; once they
have passed" and expert #9 wrote, "We maintain the highest level of integrity. Any
security concern would be given the utmost attention."
This reliance on contract clauses to minimize security problems is endorsed by the
literature. As mentioned in chapter two, there are those who have proposed that the
security framework used when IT work is outsourced, is different than when the work is
kept in-house (Fink, 1994) and that security issues for IT outsourcing agreements are
different than for most other normal commercial contracts (Rebeiro, 1996). Therefore, it
is important that those negotiating the contracts understand this so they can structure the
contract to best support an organizations security requirements. To help assist them, a
systems approach is sometimes advocated, whereby, the entire security framework is first
defined and analyzed. Following this, appropriate contract provisions can be written to
support the overall strategy (Rebeiro, 1996). These provisions might include specific
performance measures that can be assessed and tested including response times, systems
availability, data security and privacy/user authorization (Fink, 1994).

Environmental
When considering the influence of the environment on IT outsourcing decisions,
diffusion theory and external actors seem to take center stage. As mentioned in chapter
two, IT outsourcing can be considered an administrative innovation. As such, it is
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diffused or communicated through certain channels over time among the members of the
firm's social system. Of the two types of diffusion models, internal and external, the
internal version seems most applicable in this situation since it applies when organizations
are making their sourcing decision based on other organizations that have already
outsourced (Loh, 1992). This model is based on the coefficient of internal influence,
which is the likelihood that somebody who is not yet using the process will start using it
because of word-of-mouth or other influence from those already using the process
(Mahajan, 1989; Neilson, 1995). Based on this, the closer the channels of communication
are linked, and the more homogenous the group is, the quicker and more powerful the
diffusion will be. Since military related organizations are usually considered very
homogenous and well connected, it is not surprising internal diffusion theory can thrive
within it. Therefore, it is not surprising that diffusion was rated as a top determinant to IT
outsourcing. This entire idea is captured by expert #10 who commented, "there is a 'what
is everyone doing-let's follow' mentality in government." However, there are others who
felt the opposite. They believed that diffusion theory has only a small affect in their
organizations because IT managers showed resistance to outsourcing. As expert # 6
wrote, "resistance to our outsourcing has come from IT managers trying to protect their
fiefdom." Expert #10 reinforces this idea by stating, "human nature is to resist change.
Change usually occurs when motivated by an outside source."
The second top-rated environmental item was a new one submitted by an expert in
round one. This question revolved around the affect of external actors on a decision to
outsource. Since in this situation, information on the innovation is not obtained through
interorganizational communication but comes from outside the system, some might argue
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that it could be represented by the external influence model (Loh, 1992). However, it
seems more likely that it is simply an effect of the hierarchical structure inside the
Government. Since no comments were solicited in the third round for this item, it is
difficult to determine exactly what was meant by external actors, but seems reasonable,
based on in the interviews conducted at the beginning of this research, that the actors
being referenced are senior to the stakeholders. Examples might include Congressional
members or senior leadership within the executive branch.

Additional Factors
One additional factor created by the expert group also made it into the top ten
highest ranked items. The ability of outsourcing to provide a method to adopt industry
best practices and improved processes (NA1) was listed. Again, since no comments were
solicited in the third round, it is difficult to determine exactly what was meant by it.
However, one possible interpretation is that IT outsourcing allows public firms the ability
to leverage the experiences and success of private firms while learning from their mistakes.
Based on this it could be considered as a business related sub-factor. However, when the
diffusion of these process among the members of a firm is considered, it could be
considered an environmental determinant.
Limitation and Follow on Research
Perhaps the biggest limitation of this research was expert mortality. It has been
said that one of the largest problems associated with the Delphi approach is mortality and
this seems no truer than when studying IT related topics using senior leaders. The
mortality in this study was 30%, and while high, could have been even higher. During this

105

research two experts retired and two others took new jobs yet one of the retirees still
participated in the final round. This turnover, while high, is not surprising considering that
the average duration each expert in this study had held his position was less than one year.
Two potential reasons for this high turnover and inability to retain qualified senior IT
executives in the government might be the current climate in the IT community and the
strength of the economy. It is difficult for the Government to compete with lucrative
offers from the labor hungry private sector (Matthews, 2000). In an attempt to combat
these forces and lure IT workers into government service, special program and pay scales
have even been created for them (Brewin, 2000; Robb, 2000).
Another limitation was the availability and accessibility of each of the experts. As
previously mentioned, each of the experts selected were all senior executive IT leaders
within their organization. Gaining access to these individuals can be difficult enough
without trying to convince them to fill out three questionnaires, including one with 83
questions and another that required a substantial amount of writing for some. Most all of
the selected experts were very helpful and accommodating. However, given the time
constraints coupled with a change of administration, conducting another round would not
have been feasible.
Also, as mentioned in chapter four, item 19, was deleted because during the final
review it was determined that the wrong question had been attached to this items feedback
statistics in the second and third round surveys. The question that was accidentally
substituted in its place was Increase hardware utilization, which had a true average of
2.80. The original question was Reassign current internal IT resources to higher priority
activities and had the advertised average of 4.20. Therefore, if that value had remained
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constant, this item would have been included in the final top ten determinates. However,
this error, while unfortunate, lends some credibility to the Delphi process employed in this
study. Closer examination of the results shows that after the second round the average for
this question had dropped to 3.71 and a ranking of 17. After the third round it fell even
further to 3.57 and a ranking of 23. This trend is evidence that the group was working to
lower this question to its original value of 2.80.
Another potential limitation concerns the feedback provided to the group
members. As previously mentioned, the mean response of each item in the previous
questionnaire was used as feedback. However, this statistic assumes normality for each
items histogram. While a check of normality was performed after the first round on the
total number of each response, the same was not done on an item basis. Therefore, if a
bimodal distribution existed for a particular question it is conceivable that any outliers
might have been overly weighted. Also, since the threshold at the end of each round was
applied to the mean values, it is possible that some items were incorrectly deleted because
of the potential over emphasis on outliers. A review of the histograms for each item in
each round did show a bimodal distribution for a certain percentage of the items. Table 20
below summarizes these findings.
Table 20. Percentage of Questions with Bimodal Distributions
% with Bimodal Distributions
39.8%
46.5%
34%
26%
26%

Question Set
Round 1 - All Questions
Round 1 - Sub set (43 Questions)
Round 2 - All questions (43 Questions)
Round 2 - Subset (23 Questions)
Round 3 - All Questions
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As observed the percentage of questions with a bimodal distribution was larger in
the beginning. However, the quick decrease in this number was expected as consensus
started to build. Also, the fact that the final 23 questions in the last two rounds had the
same percentage is perhaps another indicator that stability had been achieved.
Suggestions for Future Research
Now that an investigation has been made as to why the DoD outsources its IT,
new studies can use it as a foundation to build upon. One possible idea for future research
might be to determine if these determinants are the best set for the DoD. During my
interviews it was painfully obvious that many senior IT executives were desperately trying
to ascertain the best set of reasons to outsource. Now that a determination has been made
as to what outsourcing determinants are currently used, a study could be undertaken to
determine what set of determinants are best. Implicit in this decision is an evaluation of
whether the current set is working or not. One possible methodology to use for such a
study might be to analyze expectations versus actual results. Another approach might be
to compare figures of merit before and after outsourcing such as cost, service, or technical
ability. One benefit for these approaches is that templates already exist (Lacity, 1994;
Smith, 1998).
Another potential research question might be to determine if IT outsourcing should
even be pursued in the DoD and if so, how much. As previously stressed, the DoD seems
to have several unique organizational requirements. However, as this research suggests,
the differences between public and private firms seems to be narrowing. Therefore, it
might be beneficial to understand if these differences are strong enough to warrant
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abandoning outsourcing and re-ihternalizing all IT functions or if outsourcing should be
considered in the DoD as much as it is in the private sector.

Conclusions
One interesting feature of this research is that it reveals, in the area of IT
outsourcing, the DoD seems to be experiencing much the same evolution the private
sector did. Currently, it seems that public firms seem to be lagging behind many private
organizations. During interviews conducted for this study, their were many who
commented that when it came to IT outsourcing, the DoD was about three too four years
behind the private sector (Barclay, 2000; Cooper, 2000). This realization might have been
motivation for inclusion of the only new factor suggested by the group, best practices and
improved processes (NA1). Perhaps including this factor is a realization by the DoD that
they have something to learn from private firms in this area. Additionally, even though
DoD outsourcing requirements might be unique, organizational attitudes and behaviors
towards outsourcing seems to be following the same evolution they did in the private
sector. There seems to be less of an emphasis now being placed on cost related factors
and more being placed on business related factors. Again, this seems to be much the same
evolution that private sector firms experienced.
Another thing that appears obvious is that each organization has a slightly different
focus and requirement set. Therefore, each of their uses of IT outsourcing will be
different. This is consistent with previous research that has shown that population
selection for any IT related research is particularly delicate (Gefen, 1998). Consequently,
it might be true that when considering IT outsourcing, it is most important to look within
a firm to determine if it is appropriate. This seems to be consistent with a new wave of
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research and interest in this area that focuses on right or smart sourcing (Lacity, 1996).
This research stream focuses on ensuring that a firm uses IT outsourcing in a manner
consistent with its needs and requirements, rather than applying some cookie cutter
approach to the problem.
With less emphasis being placed on the military in the national agenda, budgets will
probably continue to fall. However, at the same time, it has almost become a truism that
IT in any organization will become more important. Clearly, a process to lower overall IT
costs while providing the required level of information services to DoD members is
required. Many in the DoD are hoping that outsourcing will provide the solution.
Hopefully, this research has provided a better understanding of this mode of IT
governance so that what direction and goals it should take can now be considered.
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Appendix A: Questionnaire #1 and Cover Letter
This appendix contains the first questionnaire used in round #1 and the accompanying
cover letter. Please note that the numbering scheme used in this survey is different than the one
presented in the text. To match the two schemes, please refer to Appendix G for the inter-round
question numbering map.
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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR UNIVERSITY
AIR FORCE INSTITUE OF TECHNOLOGY

25 Sep 00

Dear study participant
Thank you very much for contributing to this research. It is hoped that the results will explain
why Department of Defense agencies outsource their information technology (IT) systems. Your
support helps ensure that the final product will have the highest reliability and validity possible.
This study is based on the Delphi method. The Delphi method was developed by the RAND
Corporation and is a formalized process to determine the best answer or solution to a problem
whenever insufficient or no applicable data exists. It uses a process of iterative questionnaires to
help form consensus from a panel of experts. After each round, the statistical results of the last
questionnaire are presented to the group, along with another shorter questionnaire. It's been
shown that as this process continues, individual results will converge into a final group solution.
The first questionnaire should take approximately 20 minutes to complete, the next 15 minutes
and the last one 10 minutes. You can expect each questionnaire to arrive four weeks after the
previous one.
To protect your privacy, the integrity of the process, and allow you the freedom to provide
unbiased feedback, your name, organization, and responses will be kept strictly confidential. If
any specific responses you provided need to be published, your identity will be completely
masked.
Again, thank you very much for you input. If you have any questions please feel free to
contact me at (937)235-9946 or via email at alexander.barelka@afit.af.mil
Sincerely

Alex J. Barelka, Capt, USAF
Graduate Student, AFIT
Attachment:
1. Questionnaire
2. Return envelope
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Information Technology (IT) outsourcing Questionnaire #1
Numerous studies have considered IT outsourcing in the private sector, but few have
focused on the Department of Defense (DoD). Consequently, there is no standard
framework for why IT outsourcing decisions are made by DoD agencies. Without this
information it is difficult to make any predictions about the outcome of future outsourcing
decisions.
This study attempts to create a validated list of determinants for why DoD agencies
outsource their IT systems. By providing a comprehensive framework for why
outsourcing decisions are initially made, it is hoped that future decisions can be made with
less uncertainty.
By completing the following survey, you will be helping to develop this framework. If
there are any factors not present in the survey which you think are important to an IT
outsourcing decision, please write them down in the spaces provided on pages 6 and 10.
Please remember your name, organization, and responses will be kept anonymous. The
specific information requested below is only for internal tracking purposes. Prompt return
of the survey will help maintain the integrity of this study. Therefore, please try your best
to return the completed questionnaire via fax no later than seven calendar days after
receipt. The dedicated fax number for the study is (208) 575-6528. You may also mail
the survey back in the self-addressed envelope provided.
If you have any questions regarding this effort please don't hesitate to contact me at (937)
235-9946 (h), or via e-mail at alexander.barelka@.afit.af.mil. Thank you again for your
time and assistance.
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General Information: Please print legibly

Name:

Grade/Rank::

Current organization:

Current position:

Months in current position:

Mailing Address:

Fax number:

Primary duties:

Have you ever been a member of an outsourcing event? If so, what role did you play*?
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Listed below are several potential reasons why an organization might or might not
outsource its IT systems. Please indicate the amount of consideration you feel is
appropriate for each reason when making an IT outsourcing decision for your agency. The
scale ranges from a low of 1 to a high of 5. Please note the question is whether you
consider these factors now, not if you should in the future.

Amount of Consideration
Reason
Low
1. Lower cost due to a vendors economies of scale
2. Ability of IT outsourcing to simplify management
agenda (decreases management workload)
3. Improve technical services (e.g. dissatisfaction with
current, in-house IT support)
4. High confidence that the contractor will perform to
government expectations
5. Lower costs due to a vendor's tighter control over
fringe benefits
6. Ability of IT outsourcing to flatten organizations
7. Increase customer satisfaction of IT related services
8. Access to a vendor's large research and development
efforts
9. Lower costs by vendors relocating data centers to
cheaper areas
10. Ability of IT outsourcing to leverage innovation
11. Lower costs due to a vendor's more focused expertise
in managing IT
12. Improve the long-term financial predictability of IT
budgets
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High

Amount of Consideration
13. Increase employee motivation and cohesion
14. Improve cost controls (e.g. develop standardized
processes for all agency members to follow)
15. Act as a change agent for reorganization
16. Demonstrate compliance with government guidelines
17. Absorb unnecessary IT employees generated by agency
merger
18. Convert large IT capital budgets into more flexible
operating budgets
19. Increase hardware utilization
20. Comply with Government requirements to outsource
21. Reassign current internal IT resources to higher
priority activities
22. Absorb excess IT assets after reorganization
23. Improve quantity or quality of agency outputs
24. Solve technical incompatibilities after reorganization
25. Potential for hidden costs (e.g. unexpected costs for
assumed IT services)
26. Productivity improvements
27. Retain competent IT professionals
28. Inability of a vendor to guarantee interoperability with
system they don't control
29. Inability of the vendor to meet system availability
requirements
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Amount of Consideration
30. Vendor not upgrading or keeping staff proficient
31. Complications between vendor and customer technical
IT interfaces
32. Restructuring IT budgets to allow different
appropriations to be used
33. Protect and stabilize IT budgets (e.g. placing IT on
contract to protect funding)
34. Potential that poor performing agency personnel,
whose jobs have been outsourced, will be employed by
the vendor
35. Large number of integration and system dependencies
36. Security concerns over granting an IT vendor's
maintenance personnel access to a DoD IT systems
37. Increased transactional costs (contract processing,
administration, coordination, etc.)
38. Feelings that vendor will not be able to solve agency
specific IT requirements
39. Record all costs incurred by the users
40. Locate competent IT professionals
41. Lose control over IT services
42. Security concerns over allowing outside security
specialists access to IT systems
43. Security concerns over how vendors handle agency
data on their own systems
44. Inability to meet recovery and back-up requirements
45. Potential release of system design information
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Amount of Consideration
46. Loss of critical IT skills base
47. Concerns over a vendors e-mail security procedures
when discussing agency issues
48. Potential for inflated cost savings projections
49. Becoming overly dependent on contractors
50. Security concerns about subcontractors
51. Concerns over how a vendor disposes agency
information after it is no longer needed
52. Lack of trust between Government and contractors
53. Loss of control over timing and quality of outputs
54. Security risk that technical design information will be
compromised
55. Possibility that vendor will disclose classified data

Please list and rate any other important reasons why you think an agency might or might
not outsource its IT systems.
Level of Comfort
Statement
Low
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High

Level of Comfort

Listed below are several statements related to your agency and IT outsourcing. Please
rate your level of agreement for each statement. The scale ranges from a low of 1 to a
high of 5.
Level of Agreement
Statement
Low
1. I believe my agency has a high ability to write an
adequate IT service level agreement
2. I believe my response to the question above impacts
my decision to outsource
3. I believe my agency has the ability to properly manage
an IT contract
4. I believe my response to the question above impacts
my decision to outsource
5. I believe IT outsourcing lowers my agency's ability to
maximize its business opportunities
6. I believe the length of time an IT manager knows they
will be in a position affects their decision to outsource
7. I believe concern over displaced IT staff members
affects my decision to outsource
8. I believe my agency is capable of establishing its
information requirements
9. I believe IT contracts can be adequately managed by
my agency's current personnel
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High

Level of Agreement
10.1 believe IT outsourcing decreases my agency's ability
to fully leverage IT

12

3

4

5

11.1 believe the longer an IT manager is in a position, the
more it will affect their decision to outsource

12

3

4

5

12.1 believe decisions to start outsourcing are influenced
by peoples perceptions on how it affects them

12

3

4

5

13.1 believe my agency can adequately establish contract
deliverables from its information requirements

12

3

4

5

14.1 believe my response to the question above impacts
my decision to outsource
15.1 believe some IT managers solicit outsourcing
proposals in the hopes it will prove the efficiency and
continued existence of the internal IT department.
16.1 believe some IT managers solicit outsourcing
proposals so that they can get senior leaders to
authorize additional funding for an IT program by
showing them outsourcing is not more cost effective
17.1 believe some IT managers consider outsourcing to
expose exaggerated claims made by vendors, thereby
working to ensure senior leaders do not enter an
outsourcing relationship prematurely
18.1 believe some IT managers outsource to eliminate a
troublesome function that is "not worth the headaches"
19.1 believe some IT managers outsource to appear more
corporate and credible in the hopes of enhancing their
own career
20.1 believe my agency can develop a proper acquisition
strategy for its information requirements
21.1 believe my response to the question above impacts
my decision to outsource
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Level of Agreement
22.1 believe some IT managers attempt to convince senior
managers that their internal IT departments can
perform the same services an outside vendor can
perform for the same amount or less

2

3

4

5

23.1 believe some IT managers justify new resources by
starting an IT source selection knowing that vendors
will not be competitive against the internal department

2

3

4

5

24.1 believe some IT managers will start outsourcing
evaluations to prove to senior leadership that
outsourcing might not meet their expectations
25.1 believe some IT managers outsource IT to simply
eliminate a problematic function
26.1 believe the more other government agencies
outsource their IT, the more mine might
27.1 believe some IT managers outsource in the hopes that
senior management will appreciate and value them
more
28.1 believe some IT managers are interested in IT
outsourcing only because other IT managers in the
government are
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Please list and rate any other statements you feel are important to IT outsourcing.
Level of Comfort
Statement
High

Low

12

3

4

5

12

3

4

5

12

3

4

5

Please list any additional comments you have about this survey or its subject matter:

Thank you for your time
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Appendix B: Questionnaire #2 and Cover Letter
This appendix contains the first questionnaire used in round #2 and the accompanying
cover letter. Please note that the numbering scheme used in this survey is different than
the one presented in the text. To match the two schemes, please refer to Appendix G for
the inter-round question numbering map.
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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR UNIVERSITY
AIR FORCE INSTITUE OF TECHNOLOGY

29 Nov 00

Dear study participant
Thank you very much for your responses to the first round of this study. The input has been
great and so far the results look very interesting. Based on the scores provided in the last round
by the group, each question that had an average value below 3.0 has been dropped. This
represents a total reduction of about 50%. However, due to technical difficulties, another table,
with ten new questions needed to be included.
During the last round, some study participants correctly pointed out that the instructions did
not specify what type of outsourcing is being examined. This was an oversight. This research
primarily confines itself to the examination of operations and maintenance related functions and
high dollar value contracts such as large support and services agreements. Examples of items that
would not be considered in such a definition are software or hardware development, or IT
research.
Some have also expressed an opinion that the first questionnaire did not flow well. This was
anticipated due to the adherence to a strict interpretation of survey administration guidelines.
However, these guidelines have since been relaxed, so you will hopefully find this version easier
to follow! I have also attempted to format the survey in an easy to read layout. However, I have
noticed that for whatever reason, some printers do not faithfully reproduce the intended product.
Again, thank you very much for you input. If you have any questions please feel free to
contact me at (937) 235-9946 or via email at a1e-xander.barelka@afit.af.mil
Sincerely

Alex J. Barelka, Capt, USAF
Graduate Student, AFIT
Attachment:
1. Questionnaire
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Information Technology (IT) outsourcing -Questionnaire #2
Participant Name:
As you know, this study is attempting to create a validated list of determinants for why
DoD agencies outsource their IT systems. By developing a comprehensive framework for
why outsourcing decisions are initially made, it is hoped that future decisions can be made
with less uncertainty. While the purpose of the first round was to identify the top rated
determinants, the purpose of this second round is to provide you with feedback and to
further define the list.
Please notice that next to each of the following questions is your previous score and the
group average. Please consider this information and re-score each item as you see fit.
Also, for those questions which indicate that your previous response fell more than 1.25
standard deviations away from the mean, please comment on why you think this might
have occurred in the space provided.
Also, several additional factors provided by group members have also been incorporated.
Again, if there are still any factors not present in the survey which you think are important
to an IT outsourcing decision, please write them down in the spaces provided.
Prompt return of the survey will help maintain the integrity of this study. Therefore,
please try your best to return the completed questionnaire via fax no later than seven
calendar days after receipt. The dedicated fax number for the study is (208) 575-6528.
You may also e-mail your reply after simply highlighting your selections with a different
color. Or, you can mail the survey to:
AFIT/ENV BLDG 640
2950 P STREET
WRIGHT-PATTTERSON AFB OH 45433-7765
If you have any questions regarding this effort please don't hesitate to contact me at (937)
235-9946 (h), or via e-mail at a1exander.barelka@afit.af.mil. Thank you again for your
time and assistance.
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Listed below are several potential reasons why an organization might or might not
outsource its IT systems. Please indicate the amount of consideration you feel is
appropriate for each reason when making an IT outsourcing decision for your agency. The
scale ranges from a low of 1 to a high of 5. Please note the question is whether you
consider these factors now, not if you should in the future.

Group
Average

Your
Last
Answer

Amount of Consideration
Reason
High

Low

3.8

1. Lower cost due to a vendors economies of
scale

2

3

4

5

3.8

2. Lower costs due to a vendor's more focused
expertise in managing IT

2

3

4

5

3. Improve cost controls (e.g. develop
standardized processes for all agency
members to follow)
4. Record all costs incurred by the users

5

3.1

5. Convert large IT capital budgets into more
flexible operating budgets

5

3.4

6. Improve the long-term financial
predictability of IT budgets

3.200

7. Protect and stabilize IT budgets (e.g. placing
IT on contract to protect funding)

3.8

8. Ability of IT outsourcing to simplify
management agenda (decreases management
workload)

2

3

4

5

3.8

9. Ability of IT outsourcing to leverage
innovation

2

3

4

5

4.2

10. Increase hardware utilization

2

3

4

5
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Amount of Consideration

4.3

11. Improve quantity or quality of agency
outputs

4.5

12. Productivity improvements

3.2

13. Act as a change agent for reorganization

4.1

14. Improve technical services (e.g.
dissatisfaction with current, in-house IT
support)

2

3

4

5

15. Increase customer satisfaction of IT related
services

2

3

4

5

3.125

16. Retain competent IT professionals

2

3

4

5

4.111

17. Locate competent IT professionals

2

3

4

5

18. Access to a vendor's large research and
development efforts

2

3

4

5

3.1

3.125

19. Potential for hidden costs (e.g. unexpected
costs for assumed IT services)

3.222

20. Increased transactional costs (contract
processing, administration, coordination,
etc.)

3.333

21. Lose control over IT services

3.778

22. Loss of critical IT skills base
23. Becoming overly dependent on contractors
24. Loss of control over timing and quality of
outputs
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Amount of Consideration

3.111

25. Feelings that vendor will not be able to solve
agency specific IT requirements

3.2

26. Complications between vendor and customer
technical IT interfaces

3.444

27. Security concerns over granting an IT
vendor's maintenance personnel access to a
DoD IT systems

3.4

3

4

3

4

2

3

4

2

3

4

3

4

3

4

32. Concerns over a vendors e-mail security
procedures when discussing agency issues

3

4

33. Concerns over how a vendor disposes
agency information after it is no longer
needed

3

4

28. Security concerns over allowing outside
security specialists access to IT systems
29. Security concerns about subcontractors

3.375

30. Possibility that vendor will disclose classified
data
31. Security concerns over how vendors handle
agency data on their own systems

3.1

3.889

2

2

34. Inability of a vendor to guarantee
interoperability with system they don't
control
35. Large number of integration and system
dependencies

Below are new questions submitted by group members during the las round
36. Congressional Interest
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Amount of Consideration

37. Create agency wide business practice
38. Ability of IT outsourcing to make interoperability between
systems LANs better
39. Quality of Intra-agency relationships (between IT and business
units)
40. Lack of a clearly delineated set of systems, costs and service levels
41. Controlling different security levels of data without security
incident
Please list and rate any other important reasons why you think an agency might or might
not outsource its IT systems.
Level of Comfort
Statement
Low
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High

Listed below are several statements related to your agency and IT outsourcing. Please
rate your level of agreement for each statement. The scale ranges from a low of 1 to a
high of 5.

Group
Average

Your
Last
Answer

Level of Agreement
Statement
High

Low
I believe some IT managers attempt to
convince senior managers that their internal
IT departments can perform the same
services an outside vendor can perform for
the same amount or less

2

3

4

5

3.6

2. I believe some IT managers outsource to
eliminate a troublesome function that is "not
worth the headaches"

2

3

4

5

3.8

3. I believe some IT managers outsource IT to
simply eliminate a problematic function

2

3

4

5

4. I believe the length of time an IT manager
knows they will be in a position affects their
decision to outsource

2

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

3.7

3.3

5. I believe the longer an IT manager is in a
position, the more it will affect their decision
to outsource

4.2

6. I believe the more other government
agencies outsource their IT, the more mine
might

3.2

I believe some IT managers are interested in
IT outsourcing only because other IT
managers in the government are

3.6

8. I believe decisions to start outsourcing are
influenced by peoples perceptions on how it
affects them
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Level of Agreement

Below are new questions submitted by group members during the last round
9. I believe that many agencies feel that outsourcing is either
mandated or so strongly encouraged as to be, in essence mandated
10.1 believe that many senior IT managers see outsourcing as an end in
itself rather than a strategy to achieve a goal
11.1 believe outsourcing activities are not initiated by IT organizations.
External actors loom large in decisions
12.1 believe some IT managers view outsourcing as a means to adopt
industry best practices and improve processes
13.1 believe some IT managers view outsourcing as a means to
mitigate the inability of government to remove incompetent IT
workers
14.1 believe the cost of outsourcing is not clearly understood
15.1 believe outsourcing should not be done without a comprehensive
business assessment to establish value
16.1 believe managers do not determine best value prior to outsourcing

Please list and rate any other statements you feel are important to IT outsourcing.
Level of Comfort
Statement
Low
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High

Level of Comfort

Below are similar questions from the first round that needed to be re-worded to better
comply with survey administration procedures.
Level of Agreement
Statement
High

Low
1. I believe my agency has a low ability to write an
adequate IT service level agreement

2

3

4

5

2. I believe my response to the question above impacts
my decision to outsource

2

3

4

5

3. I believe my agency does not have the ability to
properly manage an IT contract

2

3

4

5

4. I believe my response to the question above impacts
my decision to outsource

2

3

4

5

5. I believe my agency is not capable of establishing its
information requirements

2

3

4

5

6. I believe IT contracts can not be adequately managed
by my agency's current personnel

2

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

7. I believe my agency can not adequately establish
contract deliverables from its information
requirements
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Level of Agreement
8. I believe my response to the question above impacts
my decision to outsource

4

9. I believe my agency can not develop a proper
acquisition strategy for its information requirements
10.1 believe my response to the question above impacts
my decision to outsource
Please list any additional comments you have about this survey or its subject matter:

Thank you for your time...
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Appendix C: Questionnaire #3 and Cover Letter
This appendix contains the first questionnaire used in round #3 and the accompanying
cover letter. Please note that the numbering scheme used in this survey is different than
the one presented in the text. To match the two schemes, please refer to Appendix G for
the inter-round question numbering map.
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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR UNIVERSITY
AIR FORCE ESSTITUE OF TECHNOLOGY

11 Jan 01

Dear study participant
Let me begin by again thanking everyone for their continued support during this study. I
realize that all of you have very important matters to attend to and that finding time to fill out
these questionnaire was sometimes difficult. However, your efforts do not appear to have been in
vain. So far the results look very interesting and will hopefully provide direct and immediate
benefits to all DoD CIO offices.
Once the study is concluded, I will be developing an executive overview of the results for
your review. If you would like, I can personally brief them to you or your staff members^I will
be moving back to the Washington D.C. area in April so such a meeting should not be difficult to
arrange. If you want the in-person briefing simply annotate that on the questionnaire, otherwise, I
will simply send you the material via e-mail.
As promised this survey is shorter; only 23 questions, no writing required. Based on the
scores provided in the last round by the group, each question that had an average value below
3.714 has been dropped. This represents another reduction of about 50%.
Again, thank you very much for you input. If you have any questions please feel free to
contact me at (937) 235-9946 or via email at a1exander.barelka@afit.af.mil

Sincerely

Alex J. Barelka, Capt, USAF
Graduate Student, AFIT
Attachment:
1. Questionnaire
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Information Technology (IT) outsourcing -Questionnaire #3

Participant Name:
As you know, this study is attempting to create a validated list of determinants for why
DoD agencies outsource their IT systems. By developing a comprehensive framework for
why outsourcing decisions are initially made, it is hoped that future decisions can be made
with less uncertainty. While the purpose of the first round was to identify the top rated
determinants, the purpose of this second round is to provide you with feedback and to
further define the list.
Prompt return of the survey will help maintain the integrity of this study. Therefore,
please try your best to return the completed questionnaire via fax no later than seven
calendar days after receipt. The dedicated fax number for the study is (208) 575-6528.
You may also e-mail your reply after simply highlighting your selections with a different
color. Or, you can mail the survey to:
AFIT/ENV BLDG 640
2950 P STREET
WRIGHT-PATTTERSON AFB OH 45433-7765
If you have any questions regarding this effort please don't hesitate to contact me at (937)
235-9946 (h), or via e-mail at a1exander.barelka@afit.af.mil. Thank you again for your
time and assistance.
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Listed below are several potential reasons why an organization might or might not
outsource its IT systems. Please indicate the amount of consideration you feel is
appropriate for each reason when making an IT outsourcing decision for your agency, The
scale ranges from a low of 1 to a high of 5. Please note the question is whether you
consider these factors now, not if you should in the future.

Group
Average

Your
Last
Answer

Amount of Consideration
Reason
High

Low

3.71

1. Lower cost due to a vendors economies of
scale

1

2

3

4

5

3.71

2. Lower costs due to a vendor's more
focused expertise in managing IT

1

2

3

4

5

3.71

3. Improve cost controls (e.g. develop
standardized processes for all agency
members to follow)

1

2

3

4

5

3.71

4. Increase hardware utilization

1

2

3

4

5

4.29

5. Improve quantity or quality of agency
outputs

1

2

3

4

5

4.43

6. Productivity improvements

1

2

3

4

5

4.14

7. Improve technical services (e.g.
dissatisfaction with current, in-house IT
support)

1

2

3

4

5

3.86

8. Increase customer satisfaction of IT
related services

1

2

3

4

5

3.86

9. Locate competent IT professionals

1

2

3

4

5

3.86

10. Security concerns over how vendors
handle agency data on their own systems

1

2

3

4

5
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Amount of Consideration

4.14

11. Create agency wide business practice

12

3

4

5

4.00

12. Lack of a clearly delineated set of systems,
costs and service levels

12

3

4

5

3.86

13. Controlling different security levels of data
without security incident

1

3

4

5

2

Listed below are several statements related to your agency and IT outsourcing. Please
rate your level of agreement for each statement. The scale ranges from a low of 1 to a
high of 5.

Group
Average

Your
Last
Answer

Level of Agreement
Statement
High

Low

4.14

I believe some IT managers attempt to
convince senior managers that their
internal IT departments can perform the
same services an outside vendor can
perform for the same amount or less

2

3

4

5

4.14

I believe some IT managers outsource to
eliminate a troublesome function that is
"not worth the headaches"

2

3

4

5

3.86

3. I believe some IT managers outsource IT
to simply eliminate a problematic function

2

3

4

5

3.71

4. I believe the longer an IT manager is in a
position, the more it will affect their
decision to outsource

2

3

4

5
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Level of Agreement

4.00

5. I believe the more other government
agencies outsource their IT, the more mine
might

3.71

6. I believe outsourcing activities are not
initiated by IT organizations. External
actors loom large in decisions

3.86

7. I believe some IT managers view
outsourcing as a means to adopt industry
best practices and improve processes

4.00

8. I believe the cost of outsourcing is not
clearly understood

4.43

9. I believe outsourcing should not be done
without a comprehensive business
assessment to establish value

3.71

10.1 believe managers do not determine best
value prior to outsourcing

Thank you for your time...
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Appendix D: Raw data from round #1
This appendix contains the raw data form the first round of the Delphi study.
Please note that while the numbering scheme presented corresponds to the numbering
used in the instruments themselves, they do not match to the scheme presented in the text.
To match the two schemes, please refer to Appendix G for the inter-round question
numbering map.
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Appendix E: Raw data from round #2
This appendix contains the raw data form the second round of the Delphi study.
Please note that while the numbering scheme presented corresponds to the numbering
used in the instruments themselves, they do not match to the scheme presented in the text.
To match the two schemes, please refer to Appendix G for the inter-round question
numbering map.
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Appendix F: Raw data from round #3
This appendix contains the raw data form the third round of the Delphi study.
Please note that while the numbering scheme presented corresponds to the numbering
used in the instruments themselves, they do not match to the scheme presented in the text.
To match the two schemes, please refer to Appendix G for the inter-round question
numbering map.
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Appendix G: Inter-round question numbering map
This appendix contains the map to match the question schemes used in each of the
three surveys with the universal coding used in the text.
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Appendix H: List of all factors, sub-factors, and associated alphanumeric
designators
This appendix contains a listing of all the factors, sub-factors and assigned
alphanumeric designators.
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FINANCIAL (F1-F4)
BENEFITS: FINANCIAL
1. Cost Reductions =F 1
a. Economies of scale
a. Tighter control over fringe benefits
b. Relocation of data centers to lower cost areas
c. More focused expertise in managing IT.
2. Improved cost controls: Develop formal and structured IT service channels = F2
3. Restructuring IT Budgets: Using different colors of money = F3
4. Protect and stabilize IT Budgets: Contracting regulations provide protection = F4
RISKS: FINANCIAL
5. Potential problems with cost reductions
a. Increased organizational costs
b. Increased Coordination costs
c. Increased Transactional costs
d. Over inflated and inaccurate cost savings projections
e. Hidden costs
f. Decreased service
BUSINESS (B1-B7)
BENEFITS: BUSINESS
1. Focus on Core Competency: Those things a company does better than any other Bl
a. Potentially leads to:
i.
Simplifying the management agenda
ii.
Flattening organizations
iii.
Leveraging innovation
iv.
Increased employee motivation and cohesion
v.
Freeing up resources in the form of funding and personnel to
apply to more strategic activities
vi.
Increased hardware utilization
vii.
Improved manufacturing yield
viii.
Productivity improvements
2. Government Regulations and guidelines = B2
a. Requirements to outsource
b. Using outsourcing as a method to demonstrate compliance with guidelines
3. Facilitating Reorganizations = B3
a. Change Agent
b. Unite dissimilar systems
i.
Solve technical incompatibilities
ii.
Absorb excess IT assets
iii.
Absorb unnecessary IT employees generated by a merger
RISKS: BUSINESS
4. Inability to write an adequate service level agreement = B4
a. Inability to establish information requirements
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5.
6.
7.

8.

b. Inability to transform requirements into deliverables
Inability to develop proper acquisition strategy
Inability to manage a contract: Using unskilled contract managers = B5
Inability to fully leverage IT: Less potential to realize and understand the true
power of IT = B6
a. Inability to get IT to act as a 'profit center'
Loss of control = B7
a. Lose control of services provided
b. Critical IT skills disappear from firm
c. Becoming overly dependent on the contractor and losing control of the
firm
d. Timing and quality of outputs

TECHNICAL (T1-T3)
BENEFITS: TECHNICAL
1. Improving Technical Services: Dissatisfaction with current, in-house IT support Tl
2. Access to Technical Talent = T2
a. Ability to find competent IT professionals
b. Ability to retain competent IT professionals
c. Ability to reassign current internal IT staff members to higher priority
activities
3. Access to New Technologies = T3
a. Access to a vendor's large research and development efforts.
RISKS: TECHNICAL
4. Potential problems with accessing technical talent
a. Same personnel used
b. Talent is not adept at solving a new customers requirements
c. Vendor does not upgrade or keep staff current
5. Potential Problems with accessing new technologies
a. Vendor and customer interfaces get complicated as systems grow
6. Inadequate recovery and back-up capability
7. Excess Integration and Interoperability problems
POLITICAL (P1-P6)
BENEFITS: POLITICAL
1. Proving efficiency: Obtaining outsourcing proposals in the hopes that it will prove
the efficiency of the internal IT departments and justify its continued existence =
PI
2. Justifying New Resources: Getting senior leaders to authorize additional funding
for an IT program by showing them outsourcing is not more cost effective = P2
3. Exposing Exaggerated Claims: Work to ensure senior leaders do not enter an
outsourcing relationship prematurely = P3
4. Eliminating a Troublesome Function: IT is not worth the headaches = P4

167

5. Breaking the so-called Glass Ceiling: Attempt by IT managers to appear more
corporate and creditable in the hopes of enhancing their own career = P5
RISKS: POLITICAL
6. Lack of Trust between Government and Contractors = P6
SECURITY (S1-S3)
RISKS: SECUIRTY
1. Controlling access to the information = S1
a. Granting vendors access to the IT infrastructure
i. Using outside security specialists
1. Disclosing classified data
b. Security concerns surrounding sub-contractors
2. Overall vendor security procedures = S2
a. How they:
i. Handle customer data on their own systems
ii. Correspond with each other via e-mail
iii. Dispose of a customers information after it is no longer needed,
3. Release of Competitive advantage = S3
a. Release of system design information
ENVIRONMETAL (E1-E3)
BENEFITS: ENVIRONMETAL
1. Length of service remaining for outsource decision makers: The length of time an
IT manager knows they will be in a position will effect their decision to outsource
= E1
2. Changes in the amount of IT outsourcing within the DoD: Diffusion theory - E3
a. When a respected firm within a social system outsources its IT, other firms
follow
RISKS: ENVIRONMETAL
3. Internal Resistance: Concern over displaced IT staff members effects a firms
decision to outsource = E2

NEW FACTORS CREATED BY EXPERTS
NEW ENVIRONMETAL
BENEFITS: ENVIRONMETAL
1. Intra Agency Relationships
2. External Actors
NEW ADDITIONAL
BENEFITS: ADDITIONAL
1. Best practices and processes
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